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MANUFACTURER'S NEGLIGENCE OF DESIGN OR
DIRECTIONS FOR USE OF A PRODUCT
,IX W. NOELt
THERE are a few jurisdictions where the rule of MacPherson v. Budck Motor
Co.' that a manufacturer may be liable for negligence to remote users of his
product is only now being accepted, 2 but in most parts of the country it is evi-
dent that the MacPherson principle has long since been adopted and has re-
ceived extensive development. Most of this development has occurred in the
situation where the plaintiff alleges simply that the particular chattel involved
in the accident was negligently and defectively manufactured. In an increasing
number of recent cases, however, the plaintiff has undertaken to establish that
the defendant's product as a whole-as distinguished from a particular item
carelessly made-is so designed as to create an unreasonable danger.
While there has been substantial authority for many years that a manufac-
turer's duty to use due care extends to the design and specifications of his
product,3 nevertheless in the design cases, particularly those involving wide-
ly-used products made by established manufacturers, judges and juries have
been understandably hesitant to impose liability. This hesitation results part-
ly from a reluctance to let a jury pass on a product prepared by experts in the
field, and partly from the realization that a judgment for a particular plaintiff
may open the door to many additional claims and suits. Occasionally there has
been apprehension that a judgment for the plaintiff will necessitate extensive
remodeling, or perhaps even removal from the market of some much-used and
widely-advertised product, with serious consequences to both the manufac-
turer and his employees.
In spite of these important considerations, negligence of design, specifica-
tions, or composition has been established in a steadily increasing number of
cases. This negligence takes many forms. For example, the manufacturer may
tProfessor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2. So far there has been no explicit acceptance of the rule in Mississippi, but it ap-
parently would have been applied, if negligence had been established, in E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954), and a federal court has
decided that Mississippi would, apply the doctrine. Mason v. American Emery Wheel
Works, 241 F.2d 906 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957) (applying Virginia law).
Likewise, in Virginia a federal court has taken the position that the AfacPherson rule in
substance applies in that state. Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951) (applying Virginia law). There still is some doubt about the
complete acceptance of the doctrine in Maryland. See 1 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 5.03, at 23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
3. See, e.g., Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938) ; 2 RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS §§ 395, comment c; 398 (1934) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 28.3 to -.4
(1956) [hereinafter cited as 2 HARPER & JAMES].
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have failed to utilize some available safety device, such as an automatic cut-off
on a vaporizer. In other cases the manufacturer has used some new material
without sufficient testing, with the result, for example, that a new alloy used
to support the wings of an airplane soon develops metal fatigue and the wing
gives way in flight. Sometimes there is simply a failure to foresee hazards
from a particular design, as when a part of the braking machinery of a bus is
placed so close to the ground that it is sheared off upon striking an obstruc-
tion on the road, or a hook of insufficient strength is supplied to support a tree
trimmer who must swing from one high branch to another.
In some of the cases the main issue has been whether a product designed
in a certain way is accompanied by proper directions for use or by adequate
warnings. An example of improper directions for use, as distinguished from
a failure to warn, occurs when the user of a machine is directed to perform
some operation at a point where a slight misstep will cause injuries. On the
other hand, a design accompanied by an inadequate warning is exemplified by
a situation where the user of a transplanting machine is adequately instructed
to use a pipe to deflect exhaust fumes from a tractor, but is not warned of the
danger, as well as the discomfort, when the tractor is used without the de-
flector.4
Where the hazard can be removed by warnings or directions for use, it is
evident that the consequences of a judgment for the plaintiff are not especially
serious for the manufacturer. As a result, there is less reluctance to allow re-
covery when the attack on the product is based on improper directions or
warnings than when it is claimed that the basic design is hazardous. The duty
to give adequate warnings as well as directions for use has been carefully
analyzed in a frequently cited article.5 While that duty often cannot be sepa-
rated from negligence of design, the emphasis in this study will be on cases
where the principal difficulty has been that the basic design of the product is
unsafe.0
As indicated, the courts have not been concerned in cases involving neg-
ligence of design with defects in an individual product resulting from a mis-
carriage of the manufacturing process. In that situation the MacPherson de-
cision itself, involving a particular automobile wheel with spokes made of
defective wood, established liability for negligence. While problems remain
4. J.C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Williams, 85 Ga. App. 538, 69 S.E.2d 816 (1952) (retailer's
liability). The cases involving the other situations suggested here will be discussed later in
the text.
5. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41
VA. L. Rxv. 145 (1955). The more recent decisions on the matter of warnings and direc-
tions are well analyzed in 1 FRumER & FRIEDMAN §§ 8.01 to -.06.
6. Design negligence has received little attention. The only significant article on this
aspect of the subject is limited to automobiles. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers
for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HAv. L. REv. 863 (1956). Two recently published
treatises on products liability give more attention to negligence of design, but relate most
of the important cases to the duty to warn. See generally FRUME & FRIEDmAN; HuRsH,
AmERic.A LAW OF PRODucTs LIARITY (1961).
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in that type of case, they are mainly problems of proof, often relating less to
negligence than to the necessity of showing that the defect existed at the time
the product left the manufacturer's plant and did not result from subsequent
misuse or expectable wear of the product. On the other hand, in the cases
where negligence of design or in directions for use is asserted, the matter of
establishing causation has only occasionally presented serious difficulty.7 Here
the main problem, as will be shown, has been to establish negligence.
As in the case of other applications of the MacPherson rule, it is not essen-
tial, with reference to design, that the product be incapable of doing harm.
The manufacturer does not have to make a product which is "accident-proof"
or "fool-proof."" Liability is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is
created. Whether or not this has occurred should be determined by general
negligence principles, which involve "a balancing of the likelihood of harm,
and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution
which would be effective to avoid the harm." There has been a considerable
tendency to lose sight of these basic negligence principles in the field of manu-
facturers' liability, and to insist that the chattel be "inherently" or "imminent-
ly" dangerous before liability is imposed.' ° These terms seem to imply that
the harm threatened must be more substantial, or more likely to occur, than
would be the case under the usual unreasonable danger test.' Many of the
recent decisions, however, have applied general negligence principles to cases
involving safety of design or specifications, and have found that all dangerous
things are to be classed as "inherently dangerous."'1 2 Thus in a case involving
use of a harmful wood preservative the court said:
The question of liability should be approached from the standpoint of the
standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent person in the
shoes of the defendant manufacturer or supplier. Such an approach will
eliminate any necessity of determining whether a particular product is
"inherently dangerous."' 1
7. See text accompanying notes 222-63 infra.
8. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) ; Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90
Ohio App. 557, 562, 107 N.E.2d 409, 411 (1951).
9. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.4, at 1542.
10. So in a case involving the use of inferior glass in a door, the court stated that
there was no liability "unless the article is inherently dangerous." Watts v. Bacon & Van
Buskirk Glass Co., 18 Ill. 2d 226, 163 N.E.2d 425 (1959), discussed at text accompanying
note 127 infra. See also Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853
(1948) (hay baler with exposed rollers not inherently dangerous), discussed at text ac-
companying note 102 infra; Beznor v. Howell, 203 Wis. 1, 233 N.W. 758 (1930) (sparklers
not inherently dangerous) ; Kerwin, v. Chippewa Shoe Mfg. Co., 163 Wis. 428, 157 N.W.
1101 (1916) (shoes with nailed soles made to look as if soles were sewn, not imminently
or inherently dangerous).
11. See 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.9; PROSSER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
12. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946) ; Annot.,
164 A.L.R. 559 (1946). See also 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 5.03 [1].
13. Smith v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704 (1959).
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Under this approach, negligence of design has been found in the case of a
number of ordinary objects, such as a lounge chair,1 4 or a top with a tack not
strong enough to hold a spring when the top is wound up.15
With reference to the gravity of the harm if it occurs, it is established as a
general doctrine of products liability that a manufacturer is not liable unless
there is risk of "substantial bodily harm" and that this means something more
than trivial injury.1 The MacPherson case, while extending liability to dan-
gerous things generally, states that the product must be "reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril" if negligently made.17 This language has been
retained, but its connotations have been somewhat softened. It has recently
been applied in the design field to such things as a rubber exerciser which
was held to involve only a risk of minor injuries,' 8 and a small tear gas gun
made to resemble a fountain pen, where again the court thought that nothing
more than temporary and minor harm was to be anticipated. 19 In both of
these decisions there were vigorous dissenting opinions, and it is doubtless to
be expected that there will be considerable difference of opinion as to what
bodily harm should be regarded as substantial.
While the harm threatened must be substantial, considerably more attention
has been given by the courts to the question of whether the harm threatened,
assuming it will be substantial, is likely to occur. After considering the various
types of negligence of design or composition which have been alleged in the
cases, analysis will be directed to the factors bearing on the central problem
of likelihood of harm. Some of these factors are the effect of prior safe, or
unsafe, use of the same design; the obviousness of the danger; and the effect
of warnings or representations of safety. Problems of likelihood are comple-
mented by problems of foreseeability, and the next section of the article will
accordingly be devoted to the latter problems, emphasizing the care and skill
demanded of the manufacturer as an expert in his field and special, recurring
problems of foreseeability. Finally consideration will be given to such matters
as termination of the risk created by the manufacturer and the effect of con-
tributory fault.
14. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956), discussed at text accompany-
ing note 20 infra.
15. Gittelson v. Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 266 App. Div. 866, 42 N.Y.S.2d 341
(1943).
16. 2 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 395, comment c (1934) ; Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 272
App. Div. 74, 69 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948) (applying
Maryland law). Thus in a case involving a detergent alleged to be of dangerous composi-
tion, it was not enough to show that the product caused "mere redness of hands" to "a small
percentage of persons," for this did not establish foreseeability of any substantial harm.
Lehner v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 208 Misc. 186, 143 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
17. 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
18. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
855 (1957).
19. Scurfield v. Federal Labs., Inc., 335 Pa. 145, 6 A.2d 559 (1939), discussed at text
accompanying note 122 infra.
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TYPES OF NEGLIGENCE OF DESIGN OR COMPOSITION
The best introduction to this expanding field of tort law may be an ex-
amination of the generic situations in which a manufacturer has been held
liable for negligence of design or composition. Though counsel for plaintiffs
have discovered a variety of artful variations in recent years, three basic situa-
tions seem evident. Sometimes a concealed danger has been created by the
manufacturer's design; more often the manufacturer has failed to supply some
needed safety device in designing his product; and in an increasing number of
cases the complaint has been that the design called for materials of inadequate
strength. These situations will be considered in turn.
Concealed Dangers
A case which clearly involved a concealed danger is Matthews v. Lawnlite
Co. 20 While the plaintiff was inspecting an aluminum lounge chair at a retail
store he sat down in it, placing his hand on the arm, with his third finger
extended over and under the arm rest. Thereupon some moving parts of the
chair amputated his finger "with the ease that one clips a choice flower with
pruning shears." In reversing an order dismissing the complaint, the court
stated that "one is not required to guard against danger in places where it is
not expected to be." The opinion goes on to say that if this mechanism was
required, it should have been covered by a housing.2 '
A different sort of concealed danger was involved in Garbutt v. Schechter.22
There a rather heavy woman sat down in an S shaped chrome chair. Because
its center of gravity was unusually far forward, the chair tipped and the
woman fell to the floor. In holding that the jury could find an unreasonable
risk, the court remarked that the chair was "of the type of newfangled crea-
tions that are called modern, and which are designed more to please the eye
than to provide the stability one expects to find when reposing the anatomy
upon a chair in a place of business."'2
There is a questionable decision involving what seems to be a concealed
defect in a washing machine.4 An unexposed movable pin, used to keep the
wringer in place, tended to become worn down rather soon, with the result
that when a sheet was pulled through the wringer, the pin was likely to be
pulled out of position and the wringer released. The plaintiff purchased one
of the machines from the defendant, which marketed the product as its own.
She used it for about two years, and then was injured when the pin was
20. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
21. Id. at 301.
22. 167 Cal. App. 2d 396, 334 P.2d 225 (1959).
23. Id. at 399, 334 P.2d at 227. The suit in this case was against the owner of the
premises rather than against the manufacturer, but it would seem that even a stronger case
could have been made against the manufacturer, who ordinarily would be more aware than
the retailer that an overweight person might cause the chair to overturn.
24. Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941).
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loosened and the wringer swung around suddenly as she was pulling a sheet
through it. A judgment for the plaintiff was set aside on the ground that there
was no evidence of negligence of design and "no duty on a manufacturer to
furnish a machine that will not wear out." It was remarked that the remedy
against such conditions lay in periodic inspections. A concurring judge, how-
ever, agreed with the reversal only because of erroneous instructions about
liability for breach of warranty, and thought that there should be a new trial
on the negligence issue, stating:
The life of the unexposed pin was two years, while that of the wringer
was ten years. This was known to defendant, which marketed the wringer
as manufacturer. The jury may have found that a reasonably circum-
spect housewife would not know or be concerned about such unexposed
part, which in this case became defective in two and a half years, or may-
be less. There was presented for the jury a fair question as to whether
the defendant should not have given notice on the sale of the wringer
that an interior part might need replacement within two years, and that
otherwise there would be danger in continued use of the wringer after
that time.25
In view of the concealed nature of the pin and its tendency to require replace-
ment well before any other parts in the machine, this view seems sound. In
the absence of a warning attached to the machine, the design involved an
unreasonable danger.
A leading aircraft decision, DeVito v. United Air Lines,26 involving a fair
weather crash against a hillside, seems based to some extent on a concealed
defect of design. The manufacturer of the aircraft, a Douglas DC-6, had notice
from test pilots that carbon dioxide, an agent used to combat fire, tended to
enter the cockpit of the plane in such quantities as to affect the pilot adverse-
ly. The manufacturer had further notice of the serious nature of this danger
from a report on the matter by some aero-medical specialists. There was evi-
dence that the crash, which occurred immediately after a period of erratic fly-
ing, was caused by the escape into the cockpit of carbon dioxide in such toxic
proportions as to cause the pilots to lose consciousness. The decision against
the manufacturer was based largely on its failure to warn the airline of the
need for the crew to wear oxygen masks upon release of the gas into any
fuselage compartment. Reference also was made, however, to the fact that the
Civil Aeronautics Regulations provided for design arrangements to prevent
hazardous quantities of carbon dioxide from entering habitable compartments.
While it was considerably easier in this case to establish breach of a duty to
warn than to establish that the design was defective, it seems likely that neg-
ligence of design was in fact present. This type of plane had been grounded
for lack of adequate fire protection, and the information about the risk from
25. Id. at 919, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 493-94 (concurring opinion).
26. 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). Cf. Maynard v. Stinson Aircraft Corp., 1 Av.
L. REP. 698 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1937) (fuel escaped to fuselage near exhaust because carburetor
drainpipe was too short; negligent design found) ; but cf. Peusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196
Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938).
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entrance into the cockpit of undue amounts of carbon dioxide was deliberately
withheld from the Civil Aeronautics Administration, perhaps because of ap-
prehension of further grounding on account of this concealed defect of design.
A recent case, McKinney v. Frodsham,2 7 illustrates a concealed danger of
design in the automotive field. As a Volkswagen car rounded a curve, the
door flew open and a small girl fell out. The plaintiff's expert, a professor of
automotive engineering, tested the car and some sixteen other Volkswagen
cars of the same 1955 model, and testified that on approximately twenty-five
per cent of the cars tested, including the one involved in the accident, the
doors, although apparently closed, could be forced open without manipulation
of the handles upon application of from ten to twenty-five pounds of force to
the latch area. He stated that the door mechanism was particularly apt to
stick in the apparently latched condition when it was covered with sticky resin
from oxidized grease. Other witnesses testified that Volkswagen doors were
hard to close. Under these circumstances the court held that the design of the
lock mechanism could be found to be unreasonably dangerous, and that the
defendant dealer could have discovered the danger by exercise of due care. If
the dealer could be found negligent, it seems clear that there was negligence
on the part of the manufacturer as well. It might be added, however, that
since the plaintiff's Volkswagen and the others tested were at least two years
old at the time of testing, and since only a small number of cars were tested,
the testimony as to negligence of design in this case does not seem very con-
vincing.28
Failure to Provide Safety Features or Devices
A considerable number of cases in recent years have involved failure to
provide some available safety device in designing a product. Occasionally even
though the safety device is in customary use in the industry a manufacturer
may escape liability on the ground that its absence is apparent. 2 In a number
27. 356 P.2d 100 (Wash. 1960).
28. A somewhat similar concealed defect was involved in a case where a defectively
designed latch on the hood of a Ford car tended to become unfastened when the car passed
over rough ground, with the result that the hood would fly up and obscure the vision of
the driver. Ford, Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946), discussed
at text accompanying notes 236-42 infra. The defendant escaped liability in that case be-
cause a safety catch had been provided to the purchaser of the car to correct the defect.
In some of the cases involving concealed defects the danger is not from the product
itself, but from the way it is packaged. See, e.g., Central Steel Tube v. Herzog, 203 F.2d
544 (8th Cir. 1953) (applying Iowa law) (plaintiff struck by lever on grain swather when
coil spring released in unpacking machine) ; Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1960) (applying New York law) (plaintiff struck in eye by rubber band used in improper
manner to bind shanks of butchered lamb). Compare Crandall v. Stop & Shop, 288 Ill.
App. 543, 6 N.E.2d 685 (1937) (spring clamp designed to keep lid on glass jar of fruit not
inherently dangerous as obvious that precautions necessary in removing clamp).
29. See, e.g., Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying New
York law), discussed at text accompanying note 89 infra; Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948), discussed at text accompanying note 102 infra.
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of decisions, however, the latent defect rule has not precluded a holding that
the failure to provide an available safety device is sufficient to establish neg-
ligence.
The decision most clearly based on this ground is Lindroth v. Walgreen
Co.30 There an infant was severely burned when a fire started near his crib,
and it was found that the fire was caused by a vaporizer which became over-
heated when the water in it boiled away after about forty-five minutes. One
of the more specific counts was that the defendant manufacturer negligently
failed to provide a cutout device which would automatically cut off the cur-
rent before the vaporizer reached the temperature at which it was likely to
set fire to surrounding objects. It appeared that some makers of vaporizers
had cutouts which operated successfully, while others did not have this device.
A judgment against both defendants for $65,000 was affirmed. While the
opinion is devoted almost exclusively to the adequacy of the evidence as to
how the fire started, it indicates that the absence of the automatic cutoff was
sufficient to make the vaporizer "an inherently dangerous instrument." On
the other hand, where the only objection made to the design of a vaporizer
was that it had a loose lid, with the result that when it was upset a child was
scalded, a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside."' It appeared that the vap-
orizer in question was of "standard and conventional type and design" and
that the loose lid provided a "natural safety valve." No available safety device
to prevent this type of accident was pointed out by the plaintiff.
A significant recent case, Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co.,32 effectively illus-
trates how a plaintiff may sometimes save himself from a directed verdict by
realizing that some needed safety feature was omitted. This case involved an
Anglia car, manufactured in England by the English Ford Company, and sold
in that country to the American Company, which in turn sold it to the Ala-
bama distributor from whom it was purchased by the plaintiff. A few days
after he had bought the car, the plaintiff turned on the ignition and the vehicle
exploded and burned, causing personal injuries. There was evidence that the
gas tank, which was located in the trunk of the car, had a small leak in its
upper part; that there were no holes or other outlets for gasoline or its vapor
to escape from the trunk; and that when the plaintiff switched on the ignition,
a spark thereby generated and caused the explosion and fire. Suit was brought
against both the English and the American companies, on negligence and war-
ranty grounds. It was found in the trial court that the American Company was
not liable for a breach of express or implied warranty because of lack of
privity, and that there was no jurisdiction over the English company. As the
court of appeals remarked, referring to these developments, the plaintiff,
though wounded, "fought on bravely until the trial court administered the
coup de grace-a directed verdict in favor of American Ford." Since the
30. 338 Il1. App. 106, 87 N.E.2d 22 (1949), aff'd, 407 Ili. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950).
31. Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951).
32. 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961) (applying Alabama law).
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American Company received the Anglia car completely assembled, the court
of appeals agreed that the inspection it was bound to make as a mere dis-
tributor would not have revealed the small crack in the gas tank, assuming
that the defect existed at the time of the plaintiff's purchase. The court went
on to hold, however, that the case should have been submitted to the jury on
the ground that there may have been negligence of design in failing to have
holes or vents in the trunk. It remarked that the American Ford Company
from its long experience in the design and manufacture of automobiles should
have realized the inherent danger. The opinion speaks of a duty to warn, and
perhaps the distributor would have been protected by an adequate warning of
the unsafe design; but it would seem that the manufacturer of the car would
be under a duty definitely to provide the vents, if they were found by the jury
to be needed for safe construction. It is fantastic to suppose that even with a
warning users of the car would check the trunk for fumes before opening it
with a lighted cigarette in hand or before turning on the ignition.
Other cases in which the finding of unreasonable danger seems to turn
mainly on the absence of an available safety device involve the lack of a re-
ducing valve on a large coffee urn,33 the absence of a device to guard against
excessive pressure in a boiler used to heat a house,3 4 and the failure to have
an adequately designed "boom dog" to keep the boom on a crane from fall-
ing when in a raised position.35 A recent case indicates that failure to equip
a gas heater with an automatic control device which will shut off all gas in
the event of a failure of the pilot light flame may cause the heater to be un-
reasonably dangerous.3 6 In Basin Oil Co. v. Baasch-Ross Tool Co.,3 7 a sus-
pension plug designed for use with oil well equipment lacked a "safety factor
adeqfiate to withstand the live-load impacts" with the result that in three
cases heavy equipment dropped 10,000 feet into the wells, causing difficulties
sufficient to require abandonment of the oil remaining in the zone-a result
for which the supplier of equipment was held liable. A quite recent aircraft
case which involved a crash of a Boeing B-52 bomber,33 holds that an alter-
nator drive could be found to be improperly designed where it had insufficient
overspeed protection for the turbine wheel on the drive, and insufficient guard-
33. Muller v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co., 298 Pa. 560, 148 Atl. 851 (1930), discussed at text
accompanying note 79 infra.
34. Crane v. Davies, 30 Ala. App. 471, 8 So. 2d 189 (1941), rev'd, 242 Ala. 570, 8 So.
2d 196 (1942), because of lack of substantial evidence that the boiler was manufactured
or assembled by defendant.
35. Brooks v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 410, 329 P.2d 575 (1958).
36. Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 112 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 1960). Compare an earlier gas
burner case in which the fact that an available safety device was not utilized helped sup-
port a verdict for the plaintiff. Hartmon v. National Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.
2d 804 (1953).
37. 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954).
38. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961) (applying Washington
law). Evidence of subsequent changes in design was admitted in this case for the limited
purpose of showing the practicability of suggested safeguards.
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ing of the wheel. As a result the wheel developed excessive speed, disin-
tegrated, and penetrated a fuel tank, causing a fire and the explosion of the
bomber. Another recent decision, of an unusual sort, involves a failure to
prevent excessive noise from a telephone receiver.39 While the plaintiff was
talking over the phone, an explosive sound caused permanent injury to her
ear. The noise also apparently cracked the ear piece of the receiver, which
was about thirty years old. Experts testified that modern phones are equipped
with various safety devices to limit the sound from the receiver. Under the
circumstances the court sustained a finding of negligence on the part of the
supplier of a receiver without the customary safeguards. 40
Occasionally a manufacturer puts out a product with a safety device but
continues to market an older model without this device. Thus in Pontifex v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,41 the latest model power mower marketed by the de-
fendant had the rope which was pulled to start the machine permanently at-
tached to a spring recoil mechanism. The plaintiff was injured when she was
struck in the eye by the rope on an earlier model. The only negligence alleged
was that the rope was not attached to the mechanism as on the later models. In
holding that a verdict properly was directed for the defendant, the court said
that it did not think "that it could be held to be negligence to sell an old model
machine, not equipped with a safety device of later models." Likewise in
Kienta v. Carlton-another power mower case-where a verdict was directed
for the defendant supplier, the court stated, "No law of which we are aware
requires that a merchant sell only the latest models or those having specified
safety features. '42 It would seem, however, that the basic inquiry should be
as to whether or not the earlier model is unreasonably dangerous, and the
presence of the safety device on later models, if the device removes a serious
risk and is easily attached, might well have a bearing on that issue. In many
cases, however, the courts probably would conclude, as in the Pontifex and
39. Gandy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 341 S.W2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960);
Note, 15 ARK. L. REv. 212 (1961).
40. In another recent case the difficulty arose from lack of a locking device on a motor-
cycle part. Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See
also Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co., 290 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 826
(1961) (applying Tennessee law). It appears from the complaint in the Tracy case that
the negligence of design on which recovery was based consisted in the failure to have on a
mulching machine "a safety device or interlock on the clean out door . . . which would
automatically stop the machine's operation when the clean out door is opened- and while the
operator or crew member is exposed to the blades of the blower fan." The plaintiff there
lost a forearm when the blower fan started, up while he was attempting to clear the fan
blades. His recovery in the trial court still is being considered on a general appeal, follow-
ing the unsuccessful special appeal on due process grounds.
41. 226 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1955) (applying Virginia law).
42. 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957). In the latest power mower case, however, in-
volving a rotary design not fully guarded at the rear, the court allowed the case to go to
the jury as to issues of negligence of design and contributory negligence. The jury found
for the defendant manufacturer. Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir.
1961) (applying Missouri law).
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Kients decisions, that where the only evidence of unreasonable danger sub-
mitted by the plaintiff is the use of a safer design in later models, this evi-
dence is not substantial enough to prevent a directed verdict.43 Perhaps to
give substantial weight routinely to the use of safety devices on later models
would place too much of a penalty on improvements, especially in view of the
tendency of juries to find that "the machine did it."
This matter may be carried a step further when it is asserted that there is
a duty to install some new safety device even after a product has been sold.
So in Ellis v. H. S. Finke, Inc.,44 one of the defendants had manufactured a
material hoist for use in construction work. The contractor for whom the
plaintiff was working purchased one of the hoists. Subsequently the manu-
facturer developed a new safety device, and sent three of the new devices to
the defendant distributor, requesting him to install them on three machines
already sold, including the one sold to the plaintiff's employer. The distributor
installed two of the devices, but failed to install one on the hoist sold to the
employer of the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff was injured when the hoist
suddenly fell forty feet to the ground.
It was asserted that the manufacturer was negligent in the construction of
the original hoist, in failing to notify the purchaser of the hazardous con-
dition of the machine, and in failing to follow up its instructions to the dealer
to install the new safety device on all three hoists already sold. The trial judge
directed a verdict for both defendants, because of lack of evidence of any
"negligence or defective construction of the original machine." He also stated,
however, "But if it had been shown here that safety device would have pre-
vented the fall of this elevator, why I would have submitted that case to you,
and I believe you would have found for the plaintiff." This suggests that the
principal basis for the decision was lack of cause in fact, rather than absence
of negligence, and that both defendants may have been under a duty to use
due care to install the new safety device on the machines already sold. In
affirming, the appellate court simply agreed that there was no causal connec-
tion between the falling of the hoist and the absence of the safety device, with-
out expressing any opinion as to the merits of the plaintiff's case had the
causal connection been present. It would seem that where a safety device can
be easily attached and will remedy a real danger, there should be a duty to
take reasonable steps to supply the safety device even to those to whom the
product already has been sold. There is no doubt that such a duty exists when
it develops that the original design is clearly defective.4
It should be added that even though a machine is equipped with a safety
device, the manufacturer may incur liability if under some conditions the de-
43. See also Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603, 605 (10th Cir. 1957)
(applying Oklahoma law to hold no duty to incorporate only features representing ultimate
in safety).
44. 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960) (applying Tennessee law).
45. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 890 (1946)
(hood of certain model of car needs safety catch to assure that it will not fly up in face of
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vice will not be operative. This point arose in a recent case where the plain-
tiff's fingers were cut off by the descent of a knife in a paper cutting ma-
chine.40 It appeared that when a door normally opened only for inspection
purposes suddenly opened, the braking mechanism would not work properly.
In holding that the complaint was improperly dismissed, the court said the
jury could "find that defendant's design of the guillotine-type paper-cutting
machine in such a manner as to permit the access doors to interfere with the
safety mechanism, without at least warning the operator of the hazard fore-
seeable by it, was negligence. ' '47
Defective Composition
Occasionally the difficulty with a design is that it specifies materials of in-
adequate strength for the purpose the product is intended to serve. 48 A case
in which particular emphasis was placed on lack of adequate strength is Goul-
ion v. Ford Motor Co.,49 involving the steering wheel on a tractor. While the
plaintiff was driving the tractor backward, turning in his seat, the rim of the
steering wheel broke in his hand, with the result that he fell and was run over
by the machine. It appeared that the seat of the tractor was without side sup-
port, and that the operator normally relied on the wheel for support. The rim
of the wheel was constructed entirely of rubber and fiber, while all other
tractor manufacturers used metal or wood for the rim. Tests made of the rim
after the accident showed that it would break under a strain less severe than
the one it might receive from the effort of a heavy man to save himself from
driver) ; Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959) (vital
part in new type of brake found to be inadequate). These cases are discussed at text ac-
companying notes 236-48 infra.
The decision in the Ellis case itself may be strengthened by the fact that a plate on the
hoist bore the warning "no riders allowed," indicating that the hoist should be used only
for materials. The opinion, however, does not discuss this point. The matter of unintended
uses is discussed at notes 164-95 infra and accompanying text.
46. Beckhausen v. E.P. Lawson Co., 9 N.Y.S.2d 726, 174 N.E.2d 327 (1961). A sub-
sequent verdict for $125,000 was set aside as excessive. 221 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1961).
47. Id. at 727, 174 N.E.2d at 328. Likewise in Hartmon v. National Heater Co., 240
Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804 (1953), the fact that other safety devices on a gas burner all
were nullified when a certain plug was removed was a factor in upholding a verdict for the
plaintiff.
48. In addition to the cases discussed in this section consider the following cases ex-
amined elsewhere in the text: Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glen L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120
(6th Cir. 1955) (applying Ohio law) (alloy which develops metal fatigue used to support
wings of airplane), discussed at text accompanying note 158 infra; Watts v. Bacon & Van
Buskirk Glass Co., 20 11. App. 2d 164, 155 N.E.2d 333 (1958) (glass asserted to be of in-
sufficient strength used for door), discussed at text accompanying note 127 infra; O'Don-
nell v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953) (malleable rather than
forged iron used in hook supplied to support man engaged in pruning tree), discussed at
text accompanying note 160 infra; Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25
N.Y.S.2d 491 (1941) (pin which wears out ahead of rest of product used in washing
machine), discussed at text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
49. 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (applying Kentucky law).
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falling, and an expert fixed the tensile strength of the rim at only slightly over
half the amount necessary for safety. The trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant, but the appellate court held a jury properly could find that the
steering wheel might break "under the strain of use which the manufacturer
should reasonably expect," and that if this was the case, the design involved
unreasonable danger. The case was distinguished from an earlier one where
it appeared that the seat on a tractor gave way. Examination of that case in-
dicates that all strains reasonably to have been expected had been anticipated
in the design of the seat, and that it had been adequately tested.50
Materials of insufficient strength likewise were involved in a case where a
stepladder suddenly collapsed while the plaintiff was standing on the top
step. 51 The collapse occurred when the spreader, or locking device, gave way.
The American Standard Safety Code for Portable Wood Ladders prescribed
a metal spreader. The defendant manufacturer had used a wood spreader,
and the wood selected, ponderosa pine, was particularly weak. Under these
circumstances it is not surprising that the court upheld a verdict for the plain-
tiff. Likewise, where a three-eighths inch metal cable was employed to sup-
port the stairway portion of a fire escape, the jury was permitted to find, on
the basis of expert testimony, that the cable was of insufficient size and
strength to withstand the stresses involved.5 2 So also where a trailer was at-
tached to its tractor by means of a "fifth wheel" made by the defendant, ma-
terials of insufficient strength were involved.53 The "fifth wheel" was held in
position by means of four one-half inch bolts, which sheared when the plain-
tiff applied the brakes, with the result that the tractor broke loose. Experts
testified that the bolts used were not of sufficient strength and should be
larger unless, as was customary, supplementary U-bolts were clamped around
the fifth wheel to hold it in place. This testimony was enough to support a
finding of negligence of design where the customary U-bolts were not added.
In a quite different sort of accident it was an inadequate tack used to hold
a wound spring on a top which caused the difficulty.r1 When a child wound
the top, the tack flew out and struck him in the eye. It was held that a jury
could properly find that "the tack was inadequate for the purpose for which
it was used."r5
50. Davlin v. Henry Ford & Son, 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927) (applying Michigan
law).
51. Heise v. J.R. Clark Co., 245 Minn. 179, 71 N.W.2d 818 (1955).
52. Cornett v. Ficks Reed Co., 172 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
53. Wallace v. Herman Body Co., 163 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1942); cf. Babylon v. Scru-
ton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958) (concrete slabs reinforced with overlapping short
rods instead of longer rods; negligent design found).
54. Gittelson v. Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 266 App. Div. 866, 42 N.Y.S.2d 341
(1943). But cf. Simmons v. Gibbs Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd per
curiam, 275 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1960) (applying Ohio law).
55. In one of the older cases it appeared that only some four-penny nails, driven up-
ward, had been used to support the deck of a tractor. When the operator walked on the
deck, as was intended, he fell through into the machinery. In permitting the jury to find
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A related situation arises where the materials are of adequate strength ex-
cept for the fact that a poorly designed part sets up unusual disintegrating
stresses. In Fredericks v. Anterican Export Lines, Inc.,56 an iron support for
a platform used by stevedores was made with a part that had a concave sur-
face formed over too small a radius. This defect in design tended to increase
greatly the stress put on the metal, so that it might fail even under a small
load. A finding of negligence was upheld because of the inherent weakness
resulting from this "stress raiser." This decision may have a significant bear-
ing on claims against airplane manufacturers where it is alleged that a par-
ticular design set up stresses likely to cause the sudden tearing away of a wing
when the plane is in highspeed flight.
Occasionally it is not the product itself but its container that is of inade-
quate strength. In one such case, Steele v. Rapp,57 the defendant supplied a
beauty parlor with fingernail polish contained in a one-gallon glass bottle.
While an employee of the beauty parlor was pouring some of the polish into
a smaller bottle for use at her manicure desk, she dropped the large bottle.
It broke and the polish "ignited and exploded," injuring another employee.
Since the defendant knew or should have known that the polish was highly
inflammable or explosive, it was asserted that there was negligence in dis-
tributing the product in a heavy glass bottle which would be handled by the
employees of a beauty shop, as well as in failing to warn of its dangerous
qualities. The opinion is devoted principally to a discussion of whether the
intervening negligence of the employee who dropped the bottle did not save
the defendant from liability,'- but in holding that the defendant's demurrer
should have been overruled the court remarked that "had the defendant
delivered the product in a safe container the explosion would never have
occurred."' ' D Perhaps a warning would have been sufficient to change the re-
sult in this case, although it seems foreseeable that even employees fully
advised of the inflammable and explosive character of the liquid might drop
the fragile glass bottle and cause injury. '
that a tractor so designed was "imminently dangerous" the court observed that "all that
stood between the plaintiff and the most serious injury was ... this nail ... driven into
the wood from underneath." Pierce v. C.H. Bidwell Thresher Co., 153 Mich. 323, 328, 116
N.W. 1104, 1106 (1908).
The most recent case on this point involved a surgical nail which became bent after
insertion in the narrow cavity of the plaintiff's broken femur. A verdict for the plaintiff
for $45,000 was based to some extent on testimony that the nail was of inadequate strength,
although it was also supported by evidence that the nail was defectively constructed with
a crack that was likely to grow wider. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.
1960) (applying Indiana law). There was expert testimony that even if perfect, the nail
would sustain a maximum force of 107 pounds. See Spies, Surgical Materials That Fail:
A Medicolegal Study in Liability, 14 ARx. L. REv. 1, 4 (1959).
56. 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956) (applying New
York law).
57. 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958).
58. See text accompanying notes 189-92 infra.
59. 183 Kan. at 386, 327 P2d at 1065.
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LIKELIHOOD OF HARm
Whether the alleged negligence of design involves concealed dangers, lack
of safety devices, or use of defective materials, the courts have placed special
emphasis on the problem of whether the harm threatened is likely to occur.
A number of relevant questions arise. Has the design been used safely in the
past? Or has the manufacturer found the design unsafe in the past? How
obvious is the danger created by the design? Is it a concealed danger? Has
the manufacturer given instructions to use the product in a dangerous way
or has he made unwarranted claims of the safety of the product? On the other
hand, has the manufacturer rendered the design safe by giving adequate warn-
ing of its potential danger? These questions will be considered in turn.
Extensive Safe Use by Defendant of the Same Design
When a manufacturer has used a particular design for a long time or on
an extensive scale without mishap, this would seem an important indication
that no unreasonable risk is created by continued distribution of a product of
a particular design.60 As one court puts it, "the longer a machine has been
in use before it fails the more unlikely it is that the failure was due to de-
fective construction or design." 61 Besides tending to show that the design is
not in fact unsafe, such evidence of harmless use tends to prove that even if
a considerable risk of injury in fact was involved, the manufacturer was not
unreasonable in failing to appreciate the hazard.6 2 Thus where an infant was
alleged to have been poisoned by a metallic nipple manufactured by the de-
fendant, 63 the court emphasized that "many thousands of these appliances have
been sold both in England and in the United States for a period of more than
ninety years," without any significant complaint as to their safety or efficiency
by the medical profession. Likewise in a case involving automobile brakes
alleged to be of unsafe design, a principal basis for directing a verdict for the
defendant was that if the alleged improper design were present, it would have
been "apparent in some of the hundreds of thousands of such cars in general
use at the time of this accident.""
60. See 2 HAaPER & JAXIEs § 28.12.
61. Darling v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 722, 341 P.2d 23, 29
(1959), discussed at text accompanying note 141 infra. So in a case where a tractor up-
ended, the court emphasized in its holding for defendant that 300,000 such tractors had
been used for years without similar accidents. Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 565 (1929) (applying Illinois law). In Day v. Barber-Colman
Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956), discussed at note 133 infra, the court
emphasized that some 150 doors of the design alleged to be defective had been installed
without any prior accidents.
62. See Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HARv. L. Rnv. 205,
233 (1948).
63. Cleary v. John M. Mars Co., 173 Misc. 954, 955, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41 (Sup. Ct.
1940). See also Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957), involving a power
mower, where the plaintiff's failure to point out any other accidents with any similarly
designed machine was one basis for directing a verdict against him.
64. Dillingham v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 17 F. Supp. 615, 617 (W.D. Okla. 1936).
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Actually the problem is not whether extensive safe use establishes lack of
any unreasonable danger, but rather whether a jury's inference of danger in
the face of evidence of such use is permissible. It is well settled 65 that the
following of a general custom in an industry does not always establish due
care, but in the situation now under consideration the manufacturer is ready
to show not only his conformity with the customary industry practice, but
also that there has been extensive use of the particular product without any
resulting mishap. Does such a showing conclusively negative the presence of
an unreasonable danger?
This point was a vital one in Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co. 66
There a bus, full of passengers, was going down a long hill when the braking
power failed and the vehicle crashed into a retaining wall near the foot of the
hill. Eleven passengers were killed and forty-nine were injured. In a suit
against the bus company, General Motors was joined as a defendant on
grounds of negligence in the design of the braking system. This system in-
volved the use of pet cocks to drain air chambers to get rid of moisture and
other impurities. It was desirable to have the pet cocks as low as possible for
sufficient drainage. In a loaded bus, they were close enough to the ground to
be damaged by a stone or other object on the highway. After the accident a
witness found a broken portion of a pet cock at the side of the highway
amongst the debris swept off the road. This piece matched the remaining
portion still on the bus. There was further testimony that the pet cocks could
be guarded with a shield, and this testimony was strengthened by an admis-
sion of a coach chassis engineer of General Motors that a guarded pet cock
was practical and would increase safety. There also was evidence that in truck
operations pet cocks, located as these were, had been broken off by objects on
the road. A principal defense was that experience over the years with this
type of design showed that despite the millions of miles which vehicles of this
sort had traveled on highways, no bus accident of this kind had been reported.
The court held, however, that such testimony "was not conclusive any more
than evidence of general practice in an industry is conclusive on whether
operations are conducted with due care." The case thus holds that an unrea-
sonable danger may be found by a jury in spite of extensive safe use, at least
where a design which would have prevented the accident is shown to be quite
feasible.
A more recent decision to the same effect, Hyatt v. Hyster Co., 61 involved
a crane mounted on a four-wheel frame which tapered toward the rear. There
65. See text accompanying notes 135-39 infra.
66. 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (applying Pennsylvania law).
67. 106 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd per curian on stipulation of the parties,
205 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1953). In a somewhat similar case involving a fork lift truck which
overturned when the boom was detached, the case was allowed to go to the jury even -though
there was testimony that no other trucks of this kind had overturned, but there the jury
found for the defendant manufacturer. Persons v. Gerlinger Carrier Co., 227 F.2d 337 (9th
Cir. 1955) (applying Oregon law).
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was a counter-weight at the rear to balance the weights lifted by the boom
in front. While the crane was being towed along a cobblestone street it started
to fall. The plaintiff jumped off before the machine turned over, but not soon
enough to avoid the loss of a leg and an arm. In a suit against the manufac-
turer based on negligence of design, there was testimony that the center of
gravity of the machine was too high, and that the "attachment and location
of the counter-weight could have been effected so as to afford greater stability
without sacrificing maneuverability." On the other hand there was testimony
from the sales manager of the defendant that some four thousand similar
machines, and 445 cranes completely identical with the one involved had been
produced by the defendant and that there has been no previous complaints
as to lack of stability. It further appeared that the crane involved in this ac-
cident had been in continuous use for about five years. It was held in spite
of this unrebutted testimony as to extensive safe use of the same design that
the case should be submitted to the jury. Even though the defendant showed
motion pictures of the machine going over wedge shaped blocks four inches
high, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, in the sum of $165,000.
The finding of negligence seems sustainable since the crane did in fact turn
over and there was no evidence that it struck an unpredictable sort of obstacle.
Long safe use also failed to establish safety of design in Beadles v. Servel,
Inc.,68 a somewhat unusual case involving a gas refrigerator. It appeared that
the gas burner was so designed as to permit the deposit of uncombusted car-
bon particles which restricted the air supply. Unless the mechanism was regu-
larly cleaned, the gas which burned would not be completely consumed, and
dangerous carbon monoxide gas was formed. The plaintiffs, who purchased
the machine second-hand with their house, were injured by the gas. The
defendant contended that the use of the product "over a long period of time
indicates as a matter of law that it is of proper design and construction." In
rejecting this argument the court stated:
The nature of the alleged defect in this particular refrigerator was not
that the machine wore out gradually. It was that with each moment of
use the refrigerator became increasingly dangerous, as the carbon par-
ticles restricted the air supply to the burning flame and increased the
generation of carbon monoxide gas, by reason of defective construction
of the machine. In this light the period of satisfactory service before the
defect caused harm does not indicate the machine was not defective as a
matter of law, but merely that the defect was more insidious than sudden
in its capability to cause harm.69
This case is perhaps a bit unusual in that the product became more danger-
ous with the lapse of time, but it nevertheless serves to indicate that when
there is specific evidence of negligence of design, the defendant may not be
protected from liability by long safe use. 70
68. 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
69. Id. at 146, 100 N.E.2d at 412.
70. See also Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 371, 136 A.2d 626, 632 (1957), dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 208 infra ("The fact that the product may have been used
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It is evident from these decisions that even extensive safe use of the same
design may not establish conclusively that there was no unreasonable danger,
particularly where, as in the Hyatt and Carpini cases, there is testimony that
the risk was readily discoverable and easily corrected. The thought seems to
be that the absence of any prior accidents in this situation may have been
due simply to good fortune, rather than to the absence of any unreasonable
risk. It is believed that these decisions are sound in letting the matter go to
the jury, at least where there is some expert testimony as to unsafe design.
Where, however, there is no such testimony, it would seem that the evidence
of extensive safe use should be regarded as sufficient to prevent an inference
of negligence of design from the mere fact of the accident. This point is illus-
trated by the case of Solomon v. White Motor Co., 71 where the flywheel on
a tractor came apart, causing the machine to wreck, with resulting injuries
to the plaintiff. It was alleged that the flywheel was improperly designed and
that defective steel or steel alloy was used in its manufacture. The tractor was
about five years old at the time of the accident, and had been operated be-
tween 100,000 and 200,000 miles without any prior trouble with the flywheel.
There was no testimony as to just how the design or specifications of the fly-
wheel were defective. Under these circumstances the court directed a verdict
for the defendant, stating that where a chattel has been used for a long period
of time, such as the five-year period here involved, there is a conclusive
denial that the product "involved an unreasonable risk of bodily harm." 72
Even where there is substantial evidence that the design may be unsafe, some
of the older cases take the position that a considerable period of extensive
safe use conclusively establishes that a design is not inherently dangerous,73
but this seems unsound under the modem unreasonable danger test.7 4
by many people over a considerable period of time without prior injury would not preclude
the finding of foreseeability and negligence.") ; Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271
Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639, Annot., 86 A.L.R. 941 (1930), discussed at text accompanying
note 210 infra (long safe use held not to preclude a finding of negligence).
71. 153 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1957). See Note, 56 MicH. L. Rav. 651 (1958).
72. In an earlier case, Schindley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 157 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.
1946) (applying Ohio law), it was alleged that a heavy ash gate had been improperly
designed, in that certain lugs intended to stop the movement of the gate were not strong
enough to withstand pressures to which they would be subjected. The court, in affirming
a judgment for the defendant, was considerably influenced by the fact that gates of this
same design had been extensively used, stating that defendant "had installed more than
2,000 of these Type 'C' gates throughout the country and had never had a complaint that
they were defective in design or irregular in operation." Here, however, as in the Solomon
case, there was a lack of any convincing expert testimony that the design of the gate was
inadequate.
73. See, e.g., Gorman v. Murphy Diesel Co., 42 Del. 149, 29 A.2d 145 (1942) (explosion
of diesel engine after sixteen months safe use) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 565 (1929) (applying Illinois law) (tractor somer-
saulted after two years use).
74. It might be added that in cases involving defectiveness of a particular item, evi-
dence of long safe use of the particular item claimed to be defective is sometimes regarded
as conclusively establishing that the product simply wore out and was not in fact defective
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Unsafe Use by Defendant of Same Design
It would seem that evidence of unsafe use of the same design, like evidence
of safe use, should be admissible as to the issue of whether a particular design
involves unreasonable danger.75 There are a few cases in which this view has
been adopted. So in a case involving a drum of sulphuric acid evidence that
a similar drum had burst elsewhere on the same day was admitted "for the
purpose of showing the propensity of these drums to burst, and hence their
dangerousness, and also as bearing on the cause of the burst of the Union
drum. ' 76 Likewise, in the Carpini case,77 the court admitted evidence that
unguarded pet cocks on trucks, positioned as were those on the bus whose
brakes failed, occasionally had been broken off by objects in the road. Further-
more, where a product harmful to allergic consumers is involved, it is now
well settled that testimony as to other injuries caused by the product is ad-
missible to show that an unreasonable danger is present.78
More frequently the evidence of unsafe prior use has been admitted not for
the purpose of showing that the defendant was originally negligent in pro-
ducing an article of given design, but simply to show that by the time of the
accident in question the manufacturer had notice that the design involved an
unreasonable risk, and should have taken some remedial action. This point
was involved in Muller v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co.,79 where a large coffee urn
when supplied. See, e.g., Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25 N.Y.S.2d
491 (1941), aff'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 515, 41 N.E.2d 927 (1942) ; Beckhusen v. E.P.
Lawson Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 536, 196 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1960).
These decisions are not closely in point, however, with reference to negligence of design
cases, for they are concerned, with the matter of causation and whether in fact the defect
in the particular product existed at the time it left the plant of the manufacturer. In the
design cases, the issue is rather whether or not long safe use of the product is conclusive
evidence that there was no foreseeable risk of harm from the design involved.
Even in the cases involving individual defects, recent decisions tend to allow the jury
to find that there was originally a defective weld or the like even after many years of safe
use of the item, particularly where the part in question is not one of those subject to wear
while the machine is in operation. See, e.g., Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673
(10th Cir. 1958) (applying Oklahoma law) (fifteen years of safe use did not conclusively
establish that a derrick weld was originally sound). This case overruled in Lynch v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 60 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1932) (applying Oklahoma law), where
five years safe use of a threshing machine was regarded as "a conclusive denial" that the
machine was "imminently dangerous to life and limb when defendant sold it." Id. at 224,
225.
75. See 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.13; 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN §§ 12.0112], 12.01[3].
The other accidents would seem to bear on unreasonable danger of design even though
they occur subsequently to the accident in question, although subsequent accidents of course
would not be relevant with respect to notice. See Morris, supra note 62, at 205.
76. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 317, 239 P.2d 48, 58-59 (1951).
77. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
78. Wright v. Carter Prods. Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying New York
law) ; Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. REv. 331, 334
(1959).
79. 298 Pa. 560, 148 Atl. 851 (1930).
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exploded, injuring the operator of the cafeteria in which it had been placed.
In addition to introducing expert testimony that a reducing valve was essen-
tial to safe operation of the urn, the plaintiff showed that on three earlier
occasions like accidents had occurred from failures to provide reducing valves
and that the manufacturer was aware of these earlier accidents. The court
held that this evidence was properly admitted, stating that "knowledge of the
likelihood of injury is imparted by information of like occurrences under
similar circumstances, and is a fact to be considered by the jury in determin-
ing whether proper precautions were taken."8 0
More specific consideration was given to the particular purpose for which
evidence of prior unsafe use can be introduced in Prashker v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.,8s a case involving allegations that the Beechcraft Bonanza plane had
aerodynamic design defects. The plaintiff introduced testimony concerning
specific defects of design, but the court found this testimony insufficient to
take the case to the jury, concluding that the "alleged defects were either
non-existent or present to an unavoidable extent." The chief interest of the
case lies in the plaintiff's efforts to introduce evidence of earlier fatal accidents
involving structural failure in flight by planes of similar design. Testimony
was offered that there had been forty-five such accidents, and government
statistics were offered to show "that over a six-year period prior to the acci-
dent in question the Bonanza had a rate of structural failure in flight approxi-
mately fifteen times the rate of all other single engine civil aircraft."
Testimony as to all but seven of the forty-five prior accidents was held to
have been properly excluded on the ground that the other accidents involved
earlier models lacking some improvements in the current model involved in
the suit which "improved the structural strength of the airplane." As to the
seven accidents involving planes of a design substantially the same as that of
the current model, it was held that the trial court was correct in admitting
evidence of these accidents only for the restricted purpose of showing notice
of possible defects, and not to show the existence of a defect in design. In
other words, it was held that the plaintiff must introduce some specific testi-
mony that a defect in design existed, and only then could he introduce evi-
dence of the other accidents, to show that the defendant realized or should
have realized the presence of this defect, so that a duty to correct the defect
or give additional warnings would arise.
The reasoning used to support this conclusion was that in each of the seven
accidents in question there was considerable indication that the planes may
have come apart because of the failure of the pilot to keep the plane under
control. It appeared that the plane was subject to some lateral oscillation in
rough air flight and this tended to produce vertigo and loss of control by a
pilot who was unable to retain a point of reference either by means of vision
80. Id. at 566, 148 At. at 853-54. See also De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210
F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954) (applying New Jersey law).
81. 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 91 (1961), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958) (applying Delaware law).
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or instruments. In that connection, the manufacturer's literature had empha-
sized both the importance of retaining control, and the danger of losing con-
trol when instrument flight conditions were encountered by a pilot not skilled
in instrument flying. Under these circumstances the court concluded:
The seven reports in evidence-and they may be assumed best to present
the plaintiffs' case-invariably involve pilots unqualified to fly under in-
strument conditions who nonetheless were in such conditions or, in a few
instances involving the unadmitted reports, pilots qualified for instrument
flight who were in turbulent weather when the accidents occurred. To
hold the aircraft responsible on such evidence would be utterly to disre-
gard the factor of human fallability known inevitably to occur in such
circumstances and would be patently unjustified. The reports, therefore,
do not tend to prove the existence of a defect in design of the Bonanza.
The cases cited by plaintiffs on the admissibility of prior occurrences as
evidencing existence of a dangerous condition are consequently inap-
posite.8 2
For the same reasons the court considered that the statistics as to a high rate
of structural failure of the Bonanza plane were not relevant to establish de-
fectiveness or causation, since they tended to prove nothing more than did the
individual accident reports. The opinion further indicated that the statistical
report was not relevant even as to notice, in view of "what amounts to an
explanation of each accident which contributed to the ultimate statistic."
While the Beech Aircraft case seems close to the line, it is distinguishable
from cases in which evidence of prior unsafe use of the same design has been
admitted to establish a dangerous design. In cases like the ones involving the
bus with the pet cock dangerously near the ground and the coffee urn with-
out the usual reducing valve, the accident may well have occurred without any
improper handling of the product. In the Beech Aircraft case, however, there
was a substantial likelihood of pilot failure in the case of a small airplane
operating under instrument conditions with a pilot unskilled in instrument fly-
ing. If the seven other planes had come apart when visibility was good, or
while being flown under instrument conditions by pilots skilled in that type
of flying, the court probably would have admitted the evidence of the earlier
accidents as tending to show an unsafe design. It then would hardly have
been appropriate to say, as the court did, that evidence "that the planes came
apart is not enough because of the compromise required with structural
strength in designing an aircraft which will get off the ground." If the struc-
tural accidents had occurred at a time when the pilots probably were in con-
trol of the planes, the "compromise" made would seem to be one that was
definitely unsatisfactory.
Obviousness of Danger
A final factor bearing on the likelihood of harm is the obviousness of the
danger. It is frequently asserted that a design is not unreasonably dangerous
82. Id. at 608-09.
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because the risk is one which anyone immediately would recognize and avoid.
For example, it is clear that there is no duty to provide a protective covering
or a warning with a sharp knife or axe, and it is evident that the sharpness
of such an instrument is not a defect. The risk of being cut is so obvious that
no negligence of design or directions could be found even if the plaintiff were
not barred by contributory negligence or voluntary assumption of risk. So
it is said that the supplier's liability is restricted to cases where he has "no
reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize
its dangerous condition." 83 Questions of obviousness of danger may arise in
various forms. The problem may be one of applying the latent defect rule, of
determining the effect of the manufacturer's instructions or representations
of safety, or of weighing the sufficiency of a warning to make the design safe.
Latent Defects. Suppose the danger is somewhat less obvious than that
from a sharp knife or axe? Many courts, influenced perhaps by the reluctance
of juries to find contributory negligence or voluntary assumption of risk, still
have been inclined to hold as a matter of law that there is no negligence un-
less the defective design can be classified as "latent." The leading decision
relied on to support this view is Campo v. Scofield,84 a case involving an
"onion-topping" machine which consisted of four steel rollers set in a rectan-
gular frame. To start or stop the machine, it was necessary to shift a gear
located about fifteen feet away on a tractor used for power. The plaintiff was
injured while dumping a crate of onions over the machine, when his hands
became caught in the rollers. It was asserted that the manufacturer was neg-
ligent in failing to provide a guard to prevent the hands of the user from
coming into contact with the rollers, and in failing to provide an appliance by
which the machine might be stopped quickly before serious injury occurred.
In directing a verdict for the defendant, the court emphasized the requirement
that the defect must be latent, stating,
Entirely lacking is the slightest suggestion that the machine possessed a
latent defect or a danger unknown to plaintiff; entirely lacking is any
recital that the absence of guards or a stopping device was unknown to
him; and entirely lacking is any allegation of fact indicating that defend-
ants foresaw or should reasonably have foreseen a danger to one using
the machine for its intended purpose.8 5
Looking at the above quotation as a whole, it is submitted that the Campo
decision indicates simply that obviousness of the defect, or even of the danger
itself, should be one significant factor in the determination of whether or not
the manufacturer has created an unreasonable risk. The language about fore-
seeability suggests that this remains the basic test, and that there should be
no rigid requirement that the defect must be latent. Suppose, for example, in
83. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 388, comment b (1934). As one court puts it, 'We have
not reached the state where the manufacturer is under a duty of making a machine accident
proof or fool proof." Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
84. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
85. Id. at 472, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
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the Campo case, there had been testimony that after numerous accidents all
manufacturers of onion-topping machines, except the defendant, regularly pro-
vided their machines with a guard and stopping device. Could it then be said
as a matter of law, that the defendant did not create an unreasonable risk,
even though the defect was not "latent" in the sense that the absence of the
guard and of the stopping device was evident? Any definite requirement that
the defect or the danger must be latent seems to revert to the concept that a
chattel must be "inherently" dangerous, and this concept has been replaced
under the modern decisions, by the rule that the creation of any unreasonable
danger is enough to establish negligence. Under the modern rule, even though
the absence of a particular safety precaution is obvious, there ordinarily would
be a question for the jury as to whether or not a failure to install the device
creates an unreasonable risk.86
The concept that the danger itself, as distinguished from the defect, must
be latent, bears more precisely on the basic issue of unreasonable risk, but
courts emphasizing the "latent" requirement are apt to find that the danger
is obvious whenever the alleged defect of design is obvious. This point is illus-
trated in a later New York case, Inman v. Binghanipton Housing Author-
ity,87 where a child fell off the porch of an apartment house. The principal
negligence alleged was that the porch was unfenced, and the step down from
it did not extend the full length of the stoop. It was held, reversing the appel-
late division, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action in the absence
of an allegation that the structure possessed "a latent defect or an unknown
danger. 8 8
The controversial character of a rigid "latent" requirement is well displayed
in a recent federal decision, Messina v. Clark Equipment Co.89 The machine
there involved was an earth mover with a large bucket which was raised and
lowered by two scissors arms, pivoted to the machine behind the operator's
compartment or cab, with one arm of the scissors on each side of the cab. The
operator had raised the scissors and the attached bucket. He then stepped out
of the cab. As he did so the scissors and bucket suddenly fell, and he was
crushed between an arm of the scissors and the cab. In a suit against the
manufacturer, there was testimony that "it was customary among manufac-
turers of similar machines to provide guards and safety devices to prevent an
operator from getting into or out of the cab while the arms were raised."00
The court sustained a dismissal of the plaintiff's case, on the ground that since
the operator knew that the cab did not have the customary safety device, there
was no "latent defect" or "danger unknown to the decedent."
Judge Clark, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, took the view that in the
Campo case the New York court in substance had made the basic issue the
86. 2 1EARPER & JAMES § 28.5.
87. 3 N.Y.S.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957).
88. Id. at 145, 143 N.E.2d at 899.
89. 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying New York law).
90. Id. at 292.
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lack of any reasonable foreseeability of harm, with the result that the point
that the defect was not latent, though important in that case, was not the basic
test of liability. He thought that a different situation was presented, where,
as in the Messina case, the evidence showed "a general industry practice of
installing safety devices to avoid precisely the accident which caused the death
of plaintiff's decedent." On the basis of this evidence judge Clark considered
that there was greater foreseeability of injury than in the Campo case, and
that a jury could properly "hold a manufacturer to such standards as have
been overwhelmingly and voluntarily adopted by his industry."9 1 He thus took
the view that the Campo and Inman decisions "did not shift the basic inquiry
as to the reasonable unforeseeability of the danger to a sterile definitional
quibble over whether the injury was caused by a 'latent' or a 'patent' defect."
With reference to a concession by plaintiff's counsel that the lack of the safety
device was obvious, Judge Clark pointed out that this did not amount to a
concession that the danger was obvious. It would seem that the danger in this
case in fact was not obvious or why would other manufacturers have found
it advisable to install the safety device designed to keep the operator from
stepping out of the cab? Perhaps there was contributory negligence or volun-
tary assumption of risk, but this does not necessarily follow, for the manu-
facturer, after widespread experience with the machines in various areas,
might be much more cognizant of the danger than an individual operator.
As indicated above, however, the latent defect concept still has considerable
influence in the field of negligence of design, and this influence is not confined
to New York. The concept played an important role in a Wisconsin case in-
volving a hay bailer with unguarded rollers 92 and in a Kansas case involv-
ing a tractor with an exposed universal joint in which the operator's clothing
became caught. 93 A recent North Carolina case, Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co.,94
involved a tobacco harvester. A perforated sprocket was only partially guarded,
with the result that a worker's thumb was crushed when the machine lurched
and threw her against it. In finding no evidence of negligence, the court em-
phasized the point that the alleged defect in design was plainly visible and not
"latent." The court cited, besides the Campo decision, an earlier North Caro-
lina case involving an inexpensive power mower without available safety de-
vices,95 pointing out that the absence of the safety features "was obvious, not
latent."
91. Id. at 294.
92. Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948), discussed
at text accompanying note 102 infra.
93. Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940), discussed
at note 187 infra.
94. 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959).
95. Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957), discussed at text accom-
panying note 42 supra. The obvious defect rule was referred to in the latest power mower
case, involving a rotary design unguarded at the rear, as supporting a finding of contribu-
tory negligence, but, significantly, the court did allow the case to go to the jury on the
issue of negligence of design. Siemer v. Midwest Motor Co., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1961)
(applying Missouri law).
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Perhaps the most significant recent case, however, in which the turning
point of the decision was the obviousness of the danger, is Jamieson v. Wood-
ward & Lothrop.96 The product there involved was an exerciser known as a
"Lithe-Line." This was simply a rubber rope, about the thickness of a pencil,
about forty inches long, with loops on the ends. The product was enthusias-
tically described by the manufacturer as "easily the best turn done to the body
beautiful since the curve was invented." With the exerciser the plaintiff re-
ceived a leaflet of instructions for eight exercises by means of which it stated
that "anybody could reduce." While the plaintiff was lying on the floor doing
an exercise known as the "Tummy Flattener" the rope slipped off her feet
and struck her across the eyes. The blow rendered her unconscious, detached
a retina, and resulted in permanent partial loss of vision in one eye. Suit was
brought against the manufacturer on the ground that there was a negligent
failure to "warn or otherwise protect" the user of this product. Upon a hear-
ing of this case by nine federal court of appeals judges, the action of the trial
court in granting a summary judgment for the defendant was sustained, by
a five to four decision.9 7
The principal basis for the prevailing opinion was that the danger involved
in the use of the "Lithe-Line" was obvious. Emphasis was placed on the sim-
plicity of the product, and on the fact that everyone knows that rubber con-
tracts violently when released. It was pointed out that a hammer "is not of
defective design because it may hurt the user when it slips," and that there
is no more duty to warn the user of this fact than of the fact that a sharp
knife will cut. The prevailing opinion also asserts that the "reasonably foresee-
able injury from a mishap with this rope was not great-a cut lip, bloody
nose, or black eye, at the most," and that a manufacturer is required to guard
only against the risk of substantial harm.
The dissenters emphasized that while it is obvious that rubber is elastic, a
jury might find without being unreasonable that it was not obvious that when
this exerciser was used exactly as directed, the foot strap was likely to slip,
and that if it did so it would strike the user in the face. Accordingly they
thought that a jury might find there was failure of a duty to warn, or of a
duty to "otherwise protect" the plaintiff by giving instructions for a safer way
to exercise, as with socks on, or in a position that would shift the path of the
recoil. Reference was made to a possible need for a safer design, with the use
of corrugated or flattened rubber in the footstrap. The dissenters also con-
sidered that evidence should be received, if available, concerning the frequency
of similar accidents. As to the point that only minor injuries were reasonably
foreseeable, the dissenters considered that any facial injury was substantial,
remarking that it "would be a rare woman indeed who would willingly use
96. 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
97. Suit also was brought against the retailer, on warranty grounds. The court of
appeals was unanimous in deciding that the retailer could not be held liable, because of
a statute excluding an implied warranty of fitness in the case of the sale of an article under
its patent or trade name.
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an exerciser which, without fault on her part, could give her a black eye or
a cut lip or any facial injury." They observed that if any substantial injury
was reasonably foreseeable, the nature and extent of the injury in the partic-
ular case need not be foreseeable to establish liability for negligence.
While the Janieson case is a close one, it may be that undue emphasis on
the latent defect rule caused the court to lose sight of the basic inquiry of
whether or not an unreasonable danger was created. There is a real risk under
this rule that trial court judges, when faced with a negligence of design case,
will dismiss the matter without adequate consideration of the basic issue of
foreseeability of injury. Thomas v. Jerominek 98 is a case in point. There the
plaintiff, suing for personal injuries, alleged that the Studebaker car manu-
factured by the defendant was constructed in an unusual, unorthodox and
unsafe manner
in that the right rear door thereof was hinged at the rear side of said
door, rather than being hinged at a door post at the middle of said auto-
mobile, and in that there was built or constructed on the inside of said
right rear door two silver plated handles, the function of one of which
was to open and close said door and the other of which was to open and
close the window of said door, but the said handles were so similar in
appearance and construction that a person unfamiliar with their construc-
tion or purpose, such as the plaintiff, and in the absence of any label or
notice, would not be reasonably warned or apprised of their respective
individual functions.9 D
It would seem that this complaint, if supported by testimony as to frequent
accidents and a contrary practice of other manufacturers, might well create a
case for the jury. The trial judge, however, dismissed the complaint without
discussion, on the ground that the plaintiff "complained of nothing which re-
lates to the existence of a latent defect or a concealed danger." While the
alleged defect was apparent, the danger may well have been less apparent.1'°
Doubtless, however, many courts, apprehensive that a jury will be too inclined
to find liability even though the design created no unreasonable danger of the
harm that occurred, will continue to invoke the latent defect rule as a ques-
tionable means of protecting the manufacturer from a prejudiced verdict.
Manufacturer's Instructions to Use in Dangerous Way. Even though a de-
sign involves only what ordinarily would be regarded as an obvious danger,
98. 8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
99. Id. at 518, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
100. The decision in the Thomas case is supported, however, by Amason v. Ford Motor
Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935) (applying Georgia law) (plaintiff flung to pavement
and killed by following car when he opened a door hung at the rear instead of the front
side in a moving car; held that car not defective and plaintiff in any event barred by con-
tributory negligence). It has been noted in connection with this case that "notwithstanding
the fact that the court could find no negligence in the design of a front door hanging at the
rear, all American manufacturers subsequently changed the design of automobiles in this
respect." Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARv. L. REv. 863, 873 n.51 (1956). Recent advertisements, however, illustrate
some tendency to revert to rear-hung doors.
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recovery may be allowed on the ground that when used as directed by its
manufacturer a product becomes unreasonably dangerous. This point is illus-
trated in Wichman v. Allis Chalners Mfg. Co.,1' 1 a case involving a Roto-
Baler, designed to make cylindrical bales of hay. The pilot machine was built
in 1941, and after several variations had been tested on farms, commercial
production was begun in 1946. The baler was mounted on a single axle, pre-
ceded by a seven-foot chute sliding over the ground on skids. On the chute a
conveyor belt picked up the windrowed hay and carried it to some rollers and
other parts mounted above the axle. The rollers compressed the hay into a
thin mat, which was propelled into a cylinder and automatically wrapped with
twine. Occasionally the twine failed to engage with the rollers because there
was an insufficient supply of hay. It then became necessary for the operator
to leave his seat on the tractor and push the twine into contact with the rollers
by tossing or placing some hay against them.
In this case the plaintiff, an employee of the purchaser, was told by the
manufacturer's representative to make the twine engage by standing on the
frame of the machine and pushing the twine into contact with the rollers by
means of some hay held in his hand. He did this successfully a number of
times, but on the day of the accident the hay carried his hand into the rollers.
This caused him to fall on the conveyor belt, and his leg also was drawn into
the rollers. It was asserted in a suit against the manufacturer that there was
negligence of design in failing to equip the baler with a protective shield over
the rollers, and in giving improper directions and assurances of safety as to
the manner in which the operator might cause the twine to become re-engaged
with the rotating rollers. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found negli-
gence in both respects and freedom from contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the manufacturer relied on an earlier decision involving the same
machine, Yaun v. Allis-Chalners Mfg. Co.,10 2 where the injured operator was
attempting to engage the twine by tossing hay at the rollers. There also the
operator fell on the conveyor belt, and his arm went through the rollers. The
court had set aside a jury finding of negligence of design, principally because
"the danger from the rollers was apparent."' 0 3 In the Wicham case, however,
the court distinguished the earlier decision by emphasizing the finding that
the manufacturer's agent had given specific directions and assurances of safe-
ty. It was held that the trier of fact could reasonably find that "in relation to
101. 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954), rev'd, 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 835 (1955).
102. 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948).
103. Evidence to the effect that the rollers on harvesting machines were guarded by a
shield or hood was held to have been improperly admitted because the rollers on harvesters
were closer together than those on bailers. Even though an official of the state industrial
commission testified that a hood of the type used on harvesters and combines would have
prevented the accident and that the machine to be safe "must be equipped with a quick-
stopping device," this testimony was regarded as insufficient to establish negligence.
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such instructions" the defendant "ought reasonably to have equipped the roll-
ers with some shield or guard," and that the manufacturer's directions and
assurances were "not so obviously glaring and dangerous" that it must be held
as a matter of law that "a normally prudent person would have refused to rely
on them."'1
Representation of Safety. Another factor, besides improper directions for
use, which tends to keep a danger from being obvious is the presence of an
assurance or representation of safety by the manufacturer. 10 5 An illustration
of this point is provided by Crist v. Art Metal Works, 06 a case involving a
toy revolver which discharged a shower of sparks when the trigger was pulled.
It was asserted in advertising matter that this toy was "absolutely safe" for
use by children. While it was being used by a child the sparks ignited some
whiskers or soft cotton material on a Santa Claus suit which he was wearing,
and serious burns resulted. It was urged that since only "cold sparks" were
emitted from the pistol, no unreasonable danger was involved. A majority of
the court, however, found that the advertising matter accompanying the prod-
uct might induce its use "in such a manner as to make an otherwise harmless
article a source of danger," and that where a manufacturer markets the prod-
uct with "sweeping and unqualified representations that a child could not be
hurt by it" the plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury on the negligence issue. 10 7
104. The reversal of the judgment for the plaintiff was because of an erroneous weigh-
ing of the defendant's testimony that the improper directions were not in fact given to the
plaintiff.
The same point is made in another case decided the same year and apparently involving
the same machine. De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1954)
(applying New Jersey law). There the operator was told by the manufacturer's represen-
tative to walk near the front of a bailer which was lunging and not working properly, and
toss the accumulated hay into the chute. The operator was struck by the chute, knocked, off
balance, and carried up the conveyor to the rollers, losing his arm. In refusing to set aside
the jury's finding of negligence the court stated, "Although there may have been no duty to
warn the plaintiff to stay clear of the chute, manifestly there was a duty to refrain from
directing him to place himself there by representations that only by so doing could the
baler be made to do its work." Id. at 413. It thus appears that the latent defect rule may
not protect a manufacturer who gives negligent directions for use. It should be recalled,
however, that in the Jamieson case the court found that the danger was too obvious for
recovery even though the plaintiff was using the "Lithe-Line" there involved in the way
directed.
105. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.7, at 1548.
106. 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y. Supp. 496 (1930).
107. 243 N.Y. Supp. at 498-99. Likewise where a quite different product, dried milk
subject to deterioration, was involved it was held that the case of an infant made ill by the
milk should have been submitted to the jury because of the manufacturer's representations.
Counsel for the defendant pointed out that there was no evidence that the powder at the
time of consumption was still in the same condition as when it was purchased, and insisted
that "it is well known that dried milk products are subject to deterioration if not properly
cared for after leaving the hands of the manufacturer." The court found, however, that a
negligence issue was created by the manufacturer's representations on labels and circulars
that the product was "absolutely safe" with no suggestion anywhere "that the product is
subject to deterioration from any cause." Rosenbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 181 App.
Div. 97, 101, 168 N.Y. Supp. 505, 508 (1917).
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A quite recent case on this point involves harm to cattle from a chemical
weed killer.'0 8 This chemical, in killing some willow trees, drew nitrates from
the soil into their leaves, which were made salty and attractive to cattle by
the spray. In upholding a finding of negligence, the court emphasized repre-
sentations by the manufacturer's agent that the weed killer could be used at
this point without moving out the cattle, and statements on each bag of the
chemical that it was "not hazardous to livestock." It was observed that an
assurance of safety may well create an unreasonable danger of the harm it
operates to conceal.
In the cases just considered there was no warning of any sort. Where the
manufacturer does give a warning, the accompanying representations of safety
still may help to create an issue for the jury as to the adequacy of the warn-
ing. This point was made in a case involving some cleaning fluid containing
carbon tetrachloride.'0 9 There was a warning on two sides of the can, in small
letters, reading: "Caution. Do not inhale fumes; use only in well-ventilated
places." On all four sides of the can, however, in large letters, were the words
"Safety-Kleen." A housewife who used the product in cleaning her home died
from inhalation of the fumes. The court upheld a finding that the product was
unreasonably dangerous, stating, "The word 'safety' was so conspicuously
displayed on all four sides of this can of dangerous fluid as to make the word
'Caution' and the admonition against inhaling fumes and as to use only in a
well-ventilated place seem of comparatively minor import."" 0 In a later case
involving death from carbon tetrachloride fumes the jury was permitted to
find that the warning was insufficiently prominent even in the absence of any
assurance of safety.' I
Sufficiency of Warning to Make Design Safe. In some cases a design which
involves an unreasonable risk remains unsafe in spite of a warning. Suppose,
for example, that a dress manufacturer markets an evening dress with nitro-
cellulose sizing which is so inflammable that the garment is apt to burst into
flames when touched by a lighted match or cigarette. There are two cases
where the manufacturer has been held liable in this situation."12 Apparently
108. La Plante v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 1961),
discussed at note 125 infra. The opinion quotes from 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.7 on this
matter, and likewise relies on 1 FRUmER & FRIEDMAN § 8.05 [2].
109. Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
110. Id. at 55, 41 A.2d at 852.
111. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958), discussed in 1 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN § 8.05[3].
112. Dayton v. Harlene Frocks, Inc., 274 App. Div. 1015, 86 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1948),
aff'd, 299 N.Y. 609, 86 N.E.2d 176 (1949) ; Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div.
149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E.2d 839 (1945). There also have
been a number of successful suits against retailers in inflammable dress cases, based on
breach of implied warranty of fitness. See, e.g., Frank R Jelleff, Inc. v. Braden, 233 F.2d
671 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Deffebach v. Lansburgh & Bros., 150 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 772 (1945) ; Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961);
Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952).
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in neither case was any warning given of the highly combustible nature of the
dress. It would seem, however, that a dress so designed creates an unreason-
able risk even though accompanied by a warning. Such a garment is made
not for wear in a church or other place where smoking is quite unlikely, but
for use at social functions where smoking and lighted matches are to be ex-
pected. If the dress is purchased, this means that in all probability the warn-
ing is not being taken seriously. It would seem, therefore, that a jury might
find that a design of this type creates an unreasonable hazard even though a
warning is present, particularly if a comparable dress could be made by use
of material less likely to envelope the user in flames.
A similar situation was presented where a crop-dusting chemical, designed
to kill plants with broad leaves appearing in rice fields, drifted to cotton fields
and damaged the broadleafed cotton. The manufacturer in this case published
and circulated a warning of the risk of damaging cotton and other broad-
leafed crops, but nevertheless was held liable. The actual basis for the decision
was that no sufficient test had been made as to the floating qualities of the
dust, and that under these circumstances the manufacturer should be held
strictly liable for what was regarded as an ultra-hazardous enterprise. 13 The
facts of the case seem to present, however, a negligence issue and it may well
be that a product involves an unreasonable risk if it is apt to drift and harm
valuable crops, even though there is a full and complete warning of the dan-
ger.11
4
More frequently, perhaps, the effect of a warning is to make adequate a
design which would otherwise present an unreasonable risk."15 This point is
illustrated by Foster v. Ford Motor Co.,116 where the plaintiff alleged that a
farm tractor was negligently designed. It appeared that most of the weight
was at the rear, with the result that when the machine mired and heavy power
was applied, the tractor was likely to up-end and fall over backwards on top
113. Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949). A recent
crop spraying case holds the landowner strictly liable for crop-spraying by an independent
contractor, referring to the risk of accidents on neighboring crops notwithstanding the
exercise of utmost care, and finding that "the rule of nondelegability followed in the so-
called inherently-dangerous-activity negligence cases. . . applies with equal or greater force
to the conduct of extra hazardous activity." Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 318 (Ore.
1961).
114. See Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24
TENN. L. REv. 963, 981 (1957). In a later case where the same weed killer 2-4-D, was
used not in dust form but mLxed with oil and as a result was more subject to control, it
was held that there was no basis for strict liability and that a finding by the jury that the
manufacturer was not negligent was supported by the evidence. Walton v. Sherwin-Wil-
liams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (applying Arkansas law). Several of the cases
where the manufacturer who is watching his costs too closely fails to provide a commonly
used safety device, such as an automatic cutoff on a vaporizer to prevent overheating, also
seem to present a situation where the risk would remain unreasonable even where the
product is accompanied by a warning. See 2 HARER & JAMEs § 28.3 n.5.
115. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.3.
116. 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945, Annot., 48 A.L.R. 934 (1926).
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of the operator, as it did in this case. The instructions with the product, how-
ever, warned against this danger and of the need for releasing the clutch at
once if the front end should start to lift. In holding that there was no sufficient
evidence of negligence, the court emphasized that the danger was present only
when tremendous power was applied, and that "notice of the dangerous char-
acter of the tractor under such conditions was fully set out in the Manual of
Instructions.,117
It should be borne in mind that while a warning to the purchaser of a prod-
uct may prevent his own recovery, 1 8 the manufacturer still may be liable for
negligence of design to others whom he should expect to use the product, or
to be in the vicinity of its probable use. As to such persons, the product still
may be unreasonably dangerous." 9 This point seems to be involved in the
decision considered earlier involving the gas refrigerator which emitted car-
bon monoxide gas unless the burner was regularly cleaned. Perhaps if the
original purchaser of the refrigerator had been adequately warned of a neces-
sity of cleaning the burner, the article would not have been held unreason-
ably dangerous to him. Since, however, there were no directions or warnings
attached to the product, it seems clear that any separate warning distributed
only with a new refrigerator would be inadequate for a plaintiff who was a
second-hand purchaser. In holding that a jury could find negligence of design,
the court pointed out that the refrigerator was a durable product, so that the
defendant could readily foresee that it might pass into the hands of a second-
hand user. 20
It thus appears that in some cases a design will continue to be dangerous
unless the warning is attached to the product itself in some way. Further-
more, even a warning attached to the product would not be sufficient to pro-
tect the defendant with respect to those who merely are apt to be in the
vicinity of the probable use of the chattel when the intervening carelessness
117. Id. at 347, 246 Pac. at 947. The same result was reached by another court a few
years later with respect to an accident of the same kind with the same type of tractor.
Ford Motor Co. v. Wolber, 32 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 565 (1929) (apply-
ing Illinois law).
Many other cases, dealing primarily with the duty to warn, could be cited to show how
a design may be regarded as reasonably safe only if accompanied by an adequate warning.
See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.7; 1 FRUMER & FRmAx §§ 8.01 to -.06.
In one of the more recent cases a workman was restringing a cable on a portable grain
elevator, a process occasionally necessary. He erroneously assumed that some "stop hooks"
were intended to support a heavy tube in fact supported only by the cable and was killed
when the tube fell on him. It was held that a jury could find the manufacturer negligent
in failing "to apprise the purchasing public either by labels or instructions as to the man-
ner in which the article may be safely used" and to warn of "the dangers arising out of
the process of restringing the cable." Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg. Co., 95 N.W.2d 497,
501 (Minn. 1959).
118. 2 RESTATEMENT, ToRms § 398, comment b (1934).
119. Id. at § 389.
120. Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405, 411 (1951), discussed
at text accompanying note 68 supra.
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of the owner of the product is foreseeable.1 21 Insufficient recognition seems to
have been given to this principle in Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 122
a case involving a tear gas gun made to look like a fountain pen, with the
clasp serving as a trigger. A customer picked up this innocuous looking article
for inspection and accidentally discharged the tear gas into his own face. It
was held that there was no substantial evidence of negligence on the part of
the manufacturer, since the purchaser was fully informed of the nature of the
article, and it could not be foreseen that the sale of the gun involved any
probability of injury to customers of the purchaser. It appeared, however, that
the defendant's agent had advised that the gun be kept in readiness on the
purchaser's desk. Under these circumstances, it would seem that unless equipped
with some safety appliance the gun might constitute an unreasonable hazard
to those likely to be in its vicinity. A warning to the purchaser might well
make the design safe as to him, but as a dissenting opinion in the case points
out, it was not unforeseeable that a normally inquisitive person might pick up
the gadget to examine it. It is quite likely that many courts would have let
this case go to the jury on the issue of whether the warning was sufficient
with reference to persons other than the purchaser.
FAILURE TO FORESEE
The problem of determining whether a certain type of design renders harm
likely to occur is matched by the problem of determining whether the manu-
facturer was in a position to foresee the likelihood of such harm. In the field
of manufacturers' liability questions of foreseeability are closely entwined with
the status of the defendant; as a manufacturer he is held to the knowledge
and skill of an expert in his field. Aside from questions of purely professional
foreseeability some special problems have arisen in design cases with regard to
the foreseeability of injuries from unintended uses of the product, from fire,
and from allergic reactions.
The Manufacturer as Expert
The point that anyone who enters a special field of manufacturing will be
held to possess the knowledge and skill of an expert in that field and must
"keep reasonably abreast... of techniques and devices used by practical men
in his trade"'123 is effectively made in a case involving a large tank for lique-
fied gas. 24 The tank had been made in cylindrical rather than spherical form
after the defendant manufacturer expressed confidence that cylindrical tanks
121. See 2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 388, comment d (1934).
122. 335 Pa. 145, 6 A2d 559 (1939).
123. See 2 HAuER & JAMES § 28.4, cited with approval in Wright v. Carter Prods.,
Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying New York law) ; Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25
N.J. 359, 371, 136 A.2d 626, 632 (1957) ; Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758
(Mo. 1958). See also 1 FRUmER & F=IzDrAN § 8.01.
124. Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1950)
(court sitting in Pennsylvania applying Ohio law).
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"will be just as satisfactory as the spheres have been and we feel that they
should be preferred because of the saving in cost." This prediction proved to
be far from correct; one of the tanks ruptured about a year after it had been
filled, and the resulting fire and explosions took the lives of over one hundred
persons and injured many more. In response to an assertion of negligence of
design the defendant showed that there was no established usage in favor of
the spherical shape. Since, however, there was testimony that "reasonable
persons of the skill the defendants held themselves out to possess would not
have constructed a tank of cylindrical form in this situation," a jury finding
of negligence was sustained.1'
In the determination of whether or not a manufacturer in fact has exercised
the care and skill of an expert several matters are to be considered. One of
the most significant factors, although the liquefied gas case shows that it is
not conclusive, is whether others in the field are using the same design, or a
safer design. Other factors to be considered are whether a safer design not
yet in use is known to be feasible, and whether, in the case of a new product,
there has been adequate testing. These matters can best be considered sepa-
rately.
Use by others of same design. It has been shown that extensive safe use of
the same design tends to show the absence of any unreasonable danger.120 The
point now to be considered is that use of the same design by other manufac-
turers also tends to show that the defendant has kept abreast of scientific
techniques and safety devices used by other experts in the same field. This
matter is brought out in Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co.,' 2 7 where
glass supplied by the defendant for the front door of a drug store broke into
sharp pieces as a customer was opening the door, with resulting injuries. It
appeared that after consultation with the defendant the owner of the store had
decided to use plate glass rather than the more expensive tempered glass
specified by his architect. The plaintiff contended that plate glass was unsuit-
able for the door, introducing evidence that tempered glass is five times
stronger than plate glass and that when tempered glass is broken the pieces
have rounded rather than jagged edges. The intermediate court thought that
this amounted to substantial evidence of negligence of design,1 2 8 but the Su-
preme Court reinstated a directed verdict for the defendant supplier, chiefly
because it appeared from the record that "plate glass installation was cus-
tomary and usual while the use of tempered glass was exceptional.' '12 9
125. Id. at 470. A quite recent case goes so far as to allow a jury to place on a manu-
facturer of a chemical used to kill willow trees a duty to realize that this product, in caus-
ing the death of the willows, might draw from the soil nitrates in such amounts as to en-
danger cattle, particularly since the spray left a salty residue on the leaves making them
particularly attractive to cattle. La Plant v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.V.2d
231 (Mo. App. 1961), discussed at text accompanying note 108 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 60-64 supra.
127. 18 Ill. 2d 226, 163 N.E.2d 425 (1959).
128. 20 Ill. App. 2d 164, 155 N.E.2d 333 (1958).
129. 18 Ill. 2d at 231, 163 N.E.2d at 428. Cf. Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 348 S.V.2d 196
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A number of other decisions likewise emphasize the use by other manufac-
turers of the same design as an almost conclusive indication that the requisite
expert knowledge and skill has been employed. So where the operator of a
tractor was injured from contact with an exposed, rapidly turning universal
joint between his tractor and a threshing machine to which it was attached,
and the plaintiff claimed that the joint should have been shielded, the court
ruled that there was no substantial evidence of negligence of design, partly
because of the character of the defect, but also because at the time of the ac-
cident, in 1937, so far as shown by the evidence, no device to enclose the
middle universal joint had been devised or shown to be practical. 30 Likewise
when a child was badly burned by the contents of an overturned vaporizer,
it was held that the presence of a loose and easily removable lid did not fur-
nish substantial evidence that the vaporizer was negligently designed, since
"the evidence discloses that the vaporizer was of a standard and conventional
type and design."'131 In Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 32 where a car door was
hinged at the rear instead of at the front, the court, in deciding for the de-
fendant, took judicial notice "that thousands of passenger automobiles in daily
use have their doors hinged at the rear."'133 In a recent decision involving the
adequacy of a safety mechanism on a rifle, alleged to move too easily from a
"safe" to a "fire" position, the court admitted not only testimony that other
makers of guns used the same device, but also testimony as to the good repu-
tation of the other manufacturers who used the same mechanism. 34 The repu-
tation of these other manufacturers seems clearly relevant to the issue of
whether or not the defendant used the care and skill of an expert, as well as
to the unreasonable danger issue on which it actually was admitted.
While the cases clearly indicate that use by others of the same design tends
to negative an allegation of negligence, this evidence is not always conclusive.
As stated by Justice Holmes, "What usually is done is evidence of what ought
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (landlord held liable for injuries resulting when glass portion of
door gave way while being pushed by a child).
130. Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723, 726 (1940).
131. Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 561, 107 N.E.2d 409, 411 (1951), dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 31 supra. See also Marko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 24
N.J. Super. 295, 299, 94 A.2d 348, 349 (1953), noted in 39 VA. L. R-v. 698 (1953) (testi-
mony that no other power mowers had the shield which plaintiff had alleged was essential
for safety) ; Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938) (testimony
that a gasoline in-take pipe alleged to be of improper design with reference to the risk of
escape of sparks from the muffler and exhaust was "in general use").
132. 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935) (applying Georgia law).
133. Id. at 266. So also where it was alleged that an overhead door for a building was
improperly designed in not having a device to prevent it from falling on the plaintiff dur-
ing installation, the court emphasized, in holding that a verdict for the plaintiff was proper-
ly set aside, that there was no evidence that at the time of the accident there was "a safer
or better design commonly in use in the industry" and that the defendant's design was in
customary use. Day v. Barber-Coleman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 507, 135 N.E.2d 231, 238
(1956).
134. Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (N.M. 1961).
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to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not. '135 This principle has
been applied in the field of products design in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Glenn L. Martin Co.,1 36 where the court said,
the fact that Northwest conformed to the practice of other airlines in fail-
ing to equip No. 44 with radar did not establish its exercise of ordinary
care as a matter of law. Customary practice is not ordinary care; it is
but evidence of ordinary care.137
Consequently even though a manufacturer is able to show that all others in
the field have used the same design, the court may in some cases hold that an
entire industry has been lacking in ordinary care.138 Even where there exists
a statutory requirement that some particular safeguard be provided, com-
pliance may mean only that the defendant has met a minimum standard; it
does not conclusively establish that due care has been exercised.13
Use by Others of Safer Design. Sometimes the defendant manufacturer,
instead of following an industry practice as in the cases just considered, has
used a design which differs from the one commonly employed, and has fewer
safety characteristics. In such a case, the customary use of the safer design
clearly is relevant evidence to establish that the defendant's design involves
both unreasonable danger and a failure to exercise the skill of an expert. This
point is brought out in the cases where the defendant's product lacks some
customary safety device.140 It also may be illustrated by Darling v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co.,14 1 a case involving a hinged inspection cover on the back of a
bulldozer. When the plaintiff stepped on the cover, which was latched shut,
it gave way on the hinged side and injuries resulted. The plaintiff's experts
testified that accepted procedure was to eliminate stress on the hinge by ex-
tending the deck plate lip either all the way around the deck cover, or along
the full length at the side opposite the hinge, for otherwise if the hinge broke
the latch would not remain locked, but would slide out. In upholding a verdict
for the plaintiff the court stated that it could have been found that the ac-
cident resulted partly, at least, from negligence of design, stating that it "was
a question for the jury whether a simple change in the deck plate was required
135. Texas & P. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
136. 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 882 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 937 (1956) (applying Ohio law), discussed at text accompanying note 158 infra.
137. Id. at 129. The court was referring to the situation in 1948. See also Cadillac
Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1915) ; Katz, Liability of Automobile
Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARv. L. REv. 863, 865 (1956).
138. Cf. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (applying New York law),
where Judge Learned Hand points out that "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in
the adoption of new and available devices."
139. See 1 FRUMER & FRMIDMAN § 8.07; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Fowler, 195
Ark. 122, 128, 111 S.W.2d 546, 549 (1937).
140. See text accompanying notes 29-47 supra.
141. 341 P.2d 23 (Cal. App. 1959).
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in reasonable anticipation of the failure of the weld for one cause or an-
other.' 142 It is apparent that the defendant's failure to follow an accepted
safety procedure in the design of the inspection cover was a significant factor
in the decision. 43
This decision and others like it do not mean that the manufacturer may
not be able to show, in some cases, that his product was reasonably safe even
though he has departed from customary usage. It has been stated that proof
of variance by the defendant from the ordinary usage and practice "does not
in itself establish negligence, since such a rule would make one responsible
for not adopting the most recent improvements and devices when another
might be safely employed."' 44 Where, however, the plaintiff's testimony shows
not only that the defendant's design is different from that ordinarily employed,
but is less safe, the jury is of course quite likely to find an unreasonable dan-
ger. There may even be a duty to withdraw from the market or redesign
models lacking safety features which have become standard in the industry,
on the ground that the original design now creates an unreasonable risk.
Occasionally testimony concerning failure to follow the customary practice
has been regarded as not providing any substantial evidence of negligence of
design because of emphasis on the obvious character of the danger, as in the
case where the handles opening the door and the window of a passenger auto-
mobile are unusually similar,145 or where the door in a passenger car is hung
at the rear in an unorthodox manner.' 46 Furthermore, some courts have been
rather strict in insisting that the general practice departed from be one used
in an almost identical type of machine. 47 Finally, where the plaintiff is un-
able to show a general practice of using a safer design than that employed
142. Id. at 30.
143. See also Muller v. A.P. Kirschbaum Co., 298 Pa. 560, 148 AtI. 851 (1930) (coffee
urn lacked reducing valve "customarily provided in similar construction"); Garbutt v.
Schecter, 167 Cal. App. 2d 396, 334 P.2d 225 (1959) (design of easily upset modernistic
chair represented "a wide departure from the standards of chair construction") ; Clark v.
Zurich Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. App. 1961) (steering mechanism designed by
method of manufacture which departed from that recommended as the best in the Standard
Automobile Engineer's Handbook).
144. Muller v. A.P. Kirschbaum Co., 298 Pa. 560, 564, 148 AtI. 851, 853 (1930). In a
recent case involving a die casting machine there apparently was a variance from customary
procedure in using a free floating spool in a valve without springs on either side. The
court held that this case should have been submitted to the jury, but only after testimony
by a professor of engineering that this construction constituted negligence of design, on
the ground that it resulted in vibration which could cause the spool to shift in a dangerous
way. Robinson v. Reed Prentice Corp., 286 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961) (applying California
law).
145. Thomas v. Jerominek, 8 Misc. 2d 517, 170 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1957), dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 98 supra.
146. Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1935) (applying Georgia law).
147. See, e.g., Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940) ;
Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d 853 (1948), discussed at note
103 supra.
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by the defendant, there may be difficulty in introducing testimony about the
safer design, even though it is employed by some other manufacturers. Thus
in Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 148 a case involving an overhead door which fell
on the plaintiff during installation, the plaintiff's expert testified that if the
door were equipped with a staggered lift chain, its fall would be broken, and
the design would have been more safe. There was no evidence, however, that
doors with staggered lift chains were "in common or accepted use in the in-
dustry." Under these circumstances it was held that a verdict for the plaintiff
was properly set aside, and that testimony as to other safer designs "whether
in use in the industry or not" was not admissible.
This ruling seems questionable. While it is clear that the testimony con-
cerning a safer design is less significant in a case where only a few make use
of it, such testimony has some relevance on the basic issue of whether or not
the defendant's design was reasonably safe. As indicated earlier, while cus-
tomary practice often is ordinary prudence, that is not always the case. 49 It
should be added that even though a safer design is adopted by the defendant
himself for later models, evidence of this fact may be excluded because of the
rule that evidence of changed conditions is inadmissible.5 0
Should the matter be carried a step further, and the plaintiff be permitted
to introduce testimony of a safer design not actually in use by anyone, but
known to be feasible? Even in this situation the testimony would seem rele-
vant to the issue of whether the defendant created an unreasonable danger,
for occasionally "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices."'' It is undoubtedly true, as stated in the Day
case, that there is no obligation on a manufacturer "to adopt every possible
new device which might possibly have been conceived or invented,"'1 2 but the
jury 'could be instructed that a failure to use an available device does not lead
to liability unless the failure to employ it makes the product unreasonably
dangerous. It may be that under such instructions a jury would find a failure
to use reasonable care when, for example, a conventionally designed dash,
board in a passenger automobile, with its many projections against an unyield-
ing metal background, helps produce a serious injury, even though recessed
dashboards may not be in use at the time of the accident.153 While a defendant
against whom such a verdict is rendered may feel that he has been dealt with
severely, the verdict would serve to correct such a situation as that disclosed
by the Cornell crash research group in its conclusion that "fifteen years of
148. 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956), discussed at note 133 supra.
149. See text accompanying notes 137-39 supra.
150. Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959), discussed at text
accompanying note 94 supra. There is an exception to this rule where the evidence is in-
troduced only to show that the safer design suggested is practicable. See Boeing Airplane
Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961) (applying Washington law).
151. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (applying New York law).
152. 10 Ill. App. 2d at 508, 135 N.E.2d at 238.
153. See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger
Cars, 69 HARV. L. REv. 863, 868, 869 (1956).
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automobile designs have produced no improvement as far as their injury poten-
tial is concerned, and the data pointedly suggests that the newer model auto-
mobiles are increasing the rate of fatalities in injury-producing accidents."' 5
Degree of Testing Required for New Products. Where a new product is
involved, ordinarily there is of course no evidence as to use by others of the
same design, or of a design that is more safe. The testimony will relate rather
to the question of whether or not the manufacturer, as an expert, tested his
new product sufficiently before placing it on the market.
One factor which bears closely on the adequacy of the testing is industry
practice. The point may be illustrated by the Texas City disaster case, Dale-
hite v. United States,'6 involving the explosion of fertilizer which contained
ammonium nitrate. The United States was absolved from liability not only be-
cause of the determination that a discretionary function was involved, but also
on the ground that no unreasonable danger was to be anticipated. It was so
ruled by the Supreme Court even though the trial court had found that the
fertilizer had been shipped into a congested area without adequate testing and
that its dangerous properties should have been realized. Some tests had been
made with respect to explosion and fire hazards, but the tests had been termi-
nated at an intermediate stage, against the recommendation of the testing lab-
oratory, and "in the face of the suggestion that further research might point
up suspeted but unverified dangers."'156 Under these circumstances, even
though there was evidence that private manufacturers took no more precau-
tions than did the government, it would seem that the trier of fact could
reasonably have found that there was inadequate testing. As Mr. Justice Jack-
son states in a vigorous dissent:
Where the risk involved is an explosion of a cargo-carrying train or ship,
perhaps in a congested rail yard or at a dock, the producer is not entitled
as a matter of law to treat industry practice as a conclusive guide to due
care. Otherwise, one free disaster would be permitted as to each new
product before the sanction of civil liability was thrown on the side of
high standards of safety.'57
This dissent was concurred in by two justices, but the remaining four mem-
bers of the court who participated in the decision felt that there was no knowl-
edge of any danger which was probable as distinguished from merely possible.
The above quotation suggests that another factor of special significance with
reference to the amount of testing needed is the gravity of the harm threatened.
A decision which gives more recognition to this factor than did the prevailing
154. AuTOMOTI E CRAsH I Ru Y REscR PROjECT, CoRNELL UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
COLLEGE ANNUAL REPORT i (1955). There are indications that automobile engineers pro-
posing safer designs are apt to be thrust aside in favor of salesmen and stylists. See state-
ment by engineer employed by an insurance company to design a "survival car." News-
week, May 1, 1961, p. 60.
155. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
156. Id. at 55 (dissenting opinion).
157. Id. at 55-56.
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opinion in the Dalehite case is Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin
Co.,'15 involving a Martin "202" passenger plane which crashed with thirty-
two persons aboard when a wing fell off during a thunderstorm. The plane
had flown only about five per cent of its expected service life. On the day of
the crash, in 1948, the pilot of another plane of the same kind made a routine
report of difficulty in keeping the plane in level flight. The pilot then got into
his car to drive home, but fortunately changed his mind and went back to
urge that the plane be carefully examined before its next trip. The examina-
tion disclosed that a joint in the right wing of the plane was broken, and that
the wing was being held in place only by its "skin." The remaining twenty-
three planes of this type immediately were grounded, and it was discovered
that four other planes had fatigue cracks at the wing joints at the place where
the wings on the plane that fell had broken. Suit was brought by Northwest
Airlines against the manufacturer of the plane on grounds of negligence of
design, one basic allegation being that the aluminum alloy used in the wing
joint had not been sufficiently tested for fatigue failure. Although there was
evidence that the phenomenon of fatigue in metal was little understood at the
time of this accident, the appellate court held that the case had been properly
submitted to the jury as to the adequacy of the testing as well as on other
negligence issues.15 9
Another decision which emphasizes the relation between the gravity of the
harm which may result and the duty to test is O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree
Expert Co.160 There a man pruning a tree fell fifty feet to the ground when
the metal hook that secured his safety belt to a climbing rope snapped, as he
was making a swing to another part of the tree. It was alleged in a suit against
the tree company which supplied the equipment that the hook was made of
malleable rather than forged iron and was therefore of insufficient strength for
the purpose for which it was supplied. The assembler of the hook and of an
attached clip and spring had stated that the hook was not forged and not suit-
able for safety equipment, but rather was customarily used for hanging acces-
sories on linemen's belts and for other purposes not involving critical loads.
The tree company had made no tests as to the suitability of the hooks for
supporting a tree clearance man.
In reversing the trial court and an intermediate appellate court, and hold-
ing that the jury could properly find negligence from the failure to test the
hooks, Chief Justice Vanderbilt stated:
Reasonable care requires that the article so chosen be constructed as to
perform the task to which it is dedicated. Here there was evidence that
the material used, malleable iron, was not satisfactory for this particular
158. 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 882 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 937 (1956) (applying Ohio law).
159. The jury found negligence, but also that the plaintiff was barred by contributory
negligence and voluntary assumption of risk. It was held on appeal that there was no sub-
stantial evidence of contributory fault. 0
160. 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953).
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job, that it was not the proper metal to be used where a man's life would
depend upon its effectiveness. In effect, the defendant had assumed the
liability of a manufacturer when he sold the hooks for a use never in-
tended by the manufacturer. He was therefore under a duty to ascertain
that the article was made of proper raw materials and was so manufac-
tured as to sustain the weight of a man's body.161
It is evident that in this case, as in the Northwest Airlines decision, the
gravity of the harm likely to be suffered if the product proved to have in-
adequate specifications was a principal factor in the holding that the defendant
could be found to have failed in a duty to inspect.' 6 2 A recent decision involv-
ing a spray cleaner containing tetrachloroetlyne which causes hepatitis like-
wise finds a duty, when a product contains a chemical with known possibilities
of toxic effects, "to make adequate tests before putting it on sale to the pub-
lic."'16 3
Special Problems of Foreseeability
Somewhat apart from the question of what dangers a manufacturer should
foresee and guard against because of his professional position are several much
litigated areas of foreseeability in the products field. A particularly important
area involves the duty of manufacturers to foresee intervening acts of others.
While there is no obligation to anticipate abnormal uses of a product, the ab-
normality of a particular use may be a close question. Moreover, there ordi-
narily is no duty to anticipate careless use, but where the use is by a person
not familiar with the dangers of the product, the matter of foreseeability of
the use may be a question for the jury. A considerable number of decisions
involve a second special problem-whether the manufacturer must anticipate
that his product may catch fire and cause serious harm. Finally, modern de-
cisions have imposed on manufacturers an increased duty to anticipate the
161. Id. at 338, 99 A.2d at 587. This conclusion is supported by 2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
§ 388, comment k (Supp. 1948), which places the duty of inspection on anyone who sup-
plies a chattel for a known purpose to determine if it is fit for the special use for which
it is supplied.
162. Likewise in a case where the user of a tractor relied on the steering wheel to keep
him on a seat without side supports, the use of a new material of rubber and fibre composi-
tion, without adequate testing as to its strength, led to liability. Goullon v. Ford Motor
Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930) (applying Kentucky law), discussed at text accompany-
ing note 49 supra. Reasonable testing may involve a repetition of tests for diverse uses of
the product. So where a spray designed to kill peach tree borers was subjected to tests in
a number of states, but not in Michigan, it was held that the manufacturer could be found
negligent "in distributing such product in Michigan without proper field tests having been
made in this State to determine its effect on peach trees." Ebers v. General Chem. Co.,
310 Mich. 261, 279, 17 N.W.2d 176, 183 (1945). Likewise the Arkansas crop dusting de-
cision, Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), discussed at
text accompanying notes 113-14 supra, was based partly on the fact that the dust was in-
adequately tested for the area where it was to be used.
163. Twoubley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110, 118 (1960).
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use of his product by not only so-called ordinary users, but also those sub-
ject to allergic reactions.
Foreseeability of unintenzded uses. It is established that a manufacturer's
liability for negligence is restricted to situations where the product is used "for
a purpose for which it is manufactured. ' 164 If the danger arises from use of
the product for some purpose which could not reasonably have been foreseen
by the manufacturer, it seems clear that he should not be liable. As has been
observed, "A roller skate or even a book may become an instrument of serious
injury if placed strategically at the top of a flight of stairs in the dark."'u "
The problem is to determine whether or not the use of the product involved
was in fact so unintended and unforeseeable that the case should be taken
from the jury. The same principle that there is no duty on the manufacturer
to anticipate unusual uses has been applied in a number of cases involving
defects in the individual product, as distinguished from inadequacies of de-
sign.166
In some of the cases the unusual use of the product is so clear that a verdict
is apt to be directed for the defendant on that ground. So where shoes suit-
able for ordinary wear are worn by someone they do not fit, it seems clear
that the manufacturer should not be liable for resulting injury to the feet.167
Likewise where a housewife used the defendant's alkaline product "Calgonite,"
designed for automatic dishwashers, rather than its water softener "Calgon"
in water used to wash venetian blinds, she could not recover for harm from
alkaline burns, partly because of an adequate warning on the "Calgonite"
against contact with the hands, but also because the plaintiff "used the product
for a purpose not included among those recommended by the defendant.""
38
There are a few composition or design cases where the issue of whether or
not the use was foreseeable has been left to the jury. So in Zesch v. Abrasive
Co.,' 69 the defendant had made a somewhat fragile grinding wheel, intended
164. 2 RE TATEmENT, TOrTS § 395 (1934).
165. 2 HARPER & JAmEs § 28.6.
166. Odekirk v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1960) (applying Illinois
law) ; International Derrick & Equip. Co. v. Croix, 241 F2d 216 (5th Cir.) (applying
Texas law), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957). Cf. Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heine, 128 F.2d
657 (6th Cir. 1942) (applying Michigan law); Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445
(3d Cir. 1946) (applying Pennsylvania law); Schfranek v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 54
F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) ; Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Co., 317 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1958).
167. Cf. Dubbs v. Zak Bros. Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175 N.E. 626 (1931). This suit
was against the retailer; the nonliability of the manufacturer would be more evident.
168. Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 35 N.J. Super. 319, 332, 114 A.2d 278, 285 (1955). See
also Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (manufacturer of
detergent not liable for explosion which resulted only after user mixed detergent with other
chemicals) ; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954)
(manufacturer of food for hogs and poultry not liable when processor sold product, in dis-
regard of manufacturer's warning, for use as cattle food). Cf. O'Donnell v. Asplundh Tree
Expert Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953) (supplier of a hook designed for use as harness
equipment not liable when hook used to support man pruning trees).
169. 354 Mo. 1147, 193 S.W.2d 581 (1946).
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to cut metal with its edge. If used so as to bring stress on the side of the
wheel, or if the side was used for grinding, the wheel was likely to burst or
shatter. It did shatter, and the jury, which in this case found for the defend-
ant, was held to have been properly instructed that the verdict should be
against the plaintiff if his use of the wheel was "in a manner or for a purpose
for which it was not designed." On the other hand, recovery was allowed
where a woman was injured when part of an aluminum chair on which she
was standing to reach a cupboard gave way. The chair had a U-shaped base
and tended to tip forward when weight was placed near the front, but the
court said that it could be reasonably anticipated that the chairs would "be
used for.., standing upon them."'170 Likewise, where a woman wears a highly
inflammable cocktail dress near a kitchen stove, a jury could find that this use
was foreseeable.' 7 '
There are many other cases where the foreseeability of the particular use
might have been left to the jury, but the court nevertheless has found the use
to be unusual as a matter of law. Some of these cases are discussed later in
connection with the foreseeability of harm from fire.17 2 One of the more rep-
resentative decisions involves some steel casements manufactured by the de-
fendant for use in a chapel.173 The crossbars on the casements, intended to
support glass, were about two feet apart and made of one-eighth inch steel.
It was alleged that the crossbar was inadequately fastened to the upright part
of the casement, with the result that a workman fell to his death when he
used the crossbar either as a handhold or as a footrest. In taking the case from
the jury the court stated that the casements were designed simply to support
glass windows, that they were safely designed for that purpose, and that there
was no negligence in failing to manufacture a casement so that it could be
"used safely as a ladder by an employee weighing about one hundred sixty or
one hundred seventy pounds." It was decided that this "was an entirely dif-
ferent use than that for which the casements were manufactured." There was
testimony that it was common practice for iron and steel workers to climb up
and down the casements, but the court discounted this evidence since there
was no showing that the defendant knew of the practice, or that it was so
general as to charge the defendant with notice. It may be, however, that even
in the absence of notice, a jury could properly find that this use of the case-
ments was foreseeable, particularly if the crossbars appeared to be more firm-
ly affixed than was in fact the case. If so, the design might be unsafe without
a warning.
170. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 654, 235 P2d 857,
859-60 (1951).
171. See Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239 P.2d 848 (1952). This
action was against the retailer, for negligence and breach of warranty. The negligence
count was dismissed because the retailer, unlike the manufacturer, had no reason to know
that the dress was almost explosively inflammable.
172. See text accompanying notes 196-209 infra.
173. McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959) (applying
Oklahoma law).
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A more questionable decision involves some shotgun shells.' 74 The defend-
ant had made shells of unusual explosive force, intended only for use by arms
manufacturers for testing purposes. The plaintiff received a box of the shells
from a friend, who in turn had received them from an unidentified third per-
son. They looked like ordinary commercial shells except that the words "Proof-
Load" and "7.5 Tons Pressure" appeared on them and on the boxes. The
plaintiff did not realize the meaning of these words, and when he used one of
the shells his gun barrel was blown out and he lost three fingers. A verdict
for the plaintiff was set aside on the ground that there was no evidence that
"the shells were put to a use to which the defendant had reason to expect that
they would be put." Perhaps here too the jury properly could have found that
unless the shells were more clearly marked, they might fall into the hands of
someone who would be likely to use this ordinary looking ammunition in a
shotgun.
A stronger case for unusual use can be made out where a youngster of five
splashes inflammable fingernail polish over his clothes and then sets fire to
himself,175 or where a child of nineteen months drinks poisonous shoe cleaner
with fatal results,1 76 but it would seem that even in these cases it should not
have been ruled as a matter of law that the abnormal use was unforeseeable.
A jury perhaps could find, without being unreasonable, that such uses by
small children could be anticipated when the product is not labelled as in-
flammable or poisonous so that-like matches or medicines-it will be kept
out of reach. A sounder approach is illustrated by a decision allowing the jury
to determine whether it was foreseeable that a small child might reach and
handle the exposed parts of a washing machine. 177 As stated in a standard
treatise, whenever the foreseeability of the abnormal use is doubtful, "it will
be a question for the jury whether the maker should have anticipated it."'1 s
In a number of cases the plaintiff has been using the product for the purpose
intended, but not in the manner intended. Sometimes in such a case the de-
fense of contributory negligence is available.179 In other cases, where no con-
tributory negligence is found, or where the injured party is not the careless
user himself, the question arises as to whether the manufacturer has created
an unreasonable danger. The answer ordinarily turns on whether or not the
dangerous handling of the product was foreseeable. 5 0
The foreseeability of the dangerous handling, like that of an unusual use,
would seem ordinarily to be a question for the jury. Often, however, the courts
174. Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N.Y. Supp. 862 (Sup. Ct. 1935),
aff'd, 248 App. Div. 713, 290 N.Y. Supp. 130 (1936).
175. Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App. 1944).
176. Boyd v. Frenchee Chem. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
177. Dewar v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
178. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.6.
179. See text accompanying notes 249-63 infra.
180. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447 (1934) ; cf. 1 FRU MER & FRIEDMAN § 11.04[1]
(1960). A recent case following this view is Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1961) (applying California law).
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have been inclined to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
plaintiff's improper handling of the product definitely could not have been
anticipated. This approach is illustrated in Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete
Corp.,"8 involving ready-mLxed concrete containing lime. The plaintiff had
purchased the product to cement his basement, and it was delivered into the
cellar through a chute. The ceiling was low, so the plaintiff worked on his
hands and knees. He wore ordinary work trousers which became thoroughly
saturated. When the task was completed, after about five hours, he found that
he had sustained third degree burns from contact with the alkali in the cement.
The court directed a verdict for the defendant, partly because the caustic
properties of lime products are well known, but also because of the way the
plaintiff had knelt on the cement, stating that the concrete was perfectly safe
where normal precautions are taken against prolonged application to sensitive
portions of the skin. As the opinion itself points out, however, this product
ordinarily is supplied to builders quite familiar with its qualities. It may be
that when it is sold to casual users, less accustomed to working with it, a jury
properly could find the product dangerous in the absence of directions for use
or warnings.'8 2
Exception may be taken to a decision involving a housewife who splashed
some fluid into her eye and received permanent injury while cleaning her sink
with the defendant's product. The court there also found as a matter of law
that there could be no recovery, partly because "the cleaning preparation was
not intended for use in the eye."'183 This decision may be contrasted with the
more recent one in Haberly v. Reardon Co.,8 4 involving paint containing
lime, called Bondex. While a boy was helping his father paint a brick wall,
the father's paint brush, dripping with the paint, came into contact with the
boy's eye. Within seven minutes the boy was on the operating table, but he
nevertheless lost the use of his eye. The court found no difficulty in upholding
a verdict for the plaintiff. When pressed with the cleaning fluid case, the court
stated that this decision was "wrong."''1 5 It proceeded to hold that a jury
"reasonably could have found that the defendant, as the manufacturer of
181. 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959) ; cf. Frank v. Crescent Truck Co., 244 F.2d 101
(3d Cir. 1957) (applying New Jersey law). There the operator of a fork-lift industrial
truck failed to keep his foot on a platform claimed to be too narrow, and it was crushed
against a wall; the court found an unusual use and lack of proximate cause.
182. In Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956), and
Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951), both involv-
ing concrete burns, the refusal of the court to let the case go to the jury was supported by
the fact that the injured persons were experienced concrete workers and were familiar
with the caustic qualities of the product. In Imperial v. Central Concrete, Inc., 1 App. Div.
2d 671, 146 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1955), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 939, 162 N.Y.S.2d 35, 142 N.E.2d 209
(1957), which like the Dalton case involved an action against the retailer, the court con-
sidered, as in the Katz case, that wet cement was not a dangerous substance.
183. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855, 856 (5th Cir. 1946) (applying
Louisiana law).
184. 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
185. Id. at 867.
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Bondex for use by householders, reasonably could have anticipated that it was
likely that Bondex would get into the eyes of some of those users, of some of
those who would be helping users, and of some of those who would be in the
vicinity at the time the Bondex was being used."'" 6 While it may be conceded
that neither paint nor cleaning fluid is "intended for use in the eye," it seems
quite foreseeable that such materials may in one way or another be splashed
in someone's eye. If it is necessary to use components gravely injurious to the
eyes, clearly this should not be done without a clear and emphatic warning.
8 7
A recent case involved a meat grinder which was designed with a guard
fastened by removable bolts and pins. A fellow employee of the plaintiff had
removed the guard. While the plaintiff was feeding the unguarded machine,
his foot slipped and his arm was drawn into the grinder. The court allowed
a verdict against the manufacturer to stand, on the ground that the use of the
machine without a guard was not so unforeseeable as "to relieve the manu-
facturer of liability for its failure to adopt a safe design."' 8 8 The case seems
close to the line on the foreseeability issue and perhaps would have gone the
other way if the machine had possessed either of two commonly employed
safety devices: a mechanical method of feeding the grinding device or a per-
manently attached narrow neck to the cylinder enclosing the device.
In a case already considered, 8 9 where the employee in a beauty shop
dropped a one-gallon glass bottle containing highly inflammable or explosive
fingernail polish, the refusal to let the case go to the jury operated against the
manufacturer. There the court divided as to whether the intervening act of the
careless employee who dropped the bottle saved the supplier from liability to
another employee who was injured. The dissenting judges felt that since the
product was supplied for handling by skilled employees, there was no reason
to anticipate that it would not be handled with the highest degree of care,
and that the careless act of the employee was "an independent efficient inter-
vening cause" of the plaintiff's injury.190 The majority of the court, however,
found as a matter of law that the "intervening cause might reasonably have
been anticipated" by the defendant. 19' It would seem that in view of the sharp
186. Id. at 863.
187. In another area it also seems foreseeable that a farmer will reach across an ex-
posed universal joint to control the power, even though he could have moved to a place
where he could reach the lever more safely and easily; but there also the court directed
a verdict for the defendant, partly because it decided the machine was being used "in a
most unusual and awkward manner." Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638,
646, 100 P.2d 723, 728 (1940), discussed at text accompanying note 93 supra. On the other
hand, it is understandable how a court may rule as a matter of law that it is not foresee-
able that the user of a corn dryer designed for operation at 200 degrees will turn it up to
over 400 degrees and thereby cause a fire. Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst, 229 Minn.
436, 40 N.W.2d 73 (1949).
188. Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 185 F. Supp. 751, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ; 194 F. Supp.
530 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
189. Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958), discussed at text accompany-
ing note 57 supra.
190. Id. at 390, 327 P.2d at 1068 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 386, 327 P.2d at 1065.
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division of opinion on the court itself as to the foreseeability of the interven-
ing act, this issue of fact here also should have been left for the jury, since
a finding either way would not have been clearly unreasonable.1 92
A court did leave the foreseeability of intervening careless conduct to the
jury in a case involving improper installation of a milk cooler.193 It was there
asserted that the defendant had designed the cooler without adequate insula-
tion, with the result that the plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted when his
hand became caught between the top and the lid, after a short circuit arose
on account of contact between a wire and a soldering lug. The defendant
claimed that the danger arose only when the person installing the cooler failed
to provide a ground, and produced evidence that this was "the proper method
of installation." Since, however, the equipment was usable without a ground
wire, the court held it was "for the jury to determine whether it was negligent
to manufacture the appliance in this manner and design," and if the construc-
tion was hazardous, the subsequent failure to use the customary ground wire
in making installation would not place the result outside of the risk created
by the defendant. 94
A similar approach was adopted in a case involving a tractor equipped with
a rotating pulley for use in farming operations. When the tractor went at the
recommended low gear speed of 2.3 miles per hour, the pulley would rotate
at 933 revolutions per minute. When the plaintiff went down hill with the
tractor in low gear, at a speed from five to seven miles per hour, the rotating
speed of the pulley would increase to more than 2,000 revolutions per minute.
At about this speed the pulley disintegrated and injured the plaintiff. It was
conceded by the manufacturer to be good practice to use the compression of
the engine for braking power in going down hill, and there was no warning
of the danger involved from the increased speed of the tractor. Under these
circumstances the court held that "whether the speed involved here was such
as should reasonably have been anticipated by defendant in designing and
manufacturing the tractor . . . [was a question] which should have been sub-
mitted to the jury."'15
192. See PRossER, TORTS § 50 (2d ed. 1955).
193. Steele v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 107 Ohio App. 379, 159 N.E.2d 469 (1958).
194. Likewise in a case involving a failure to inspect, the court allowed the foresee-
ability of this failure to go to the jury. Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140
N.E. 571 (1923). The defendant there had shipped a transformer to a power company with
the coils toward the bottom of the transformer supported by some concealed wooden blocks.
It was conceded that unless these blocks were moved before the power was turned on
there was likelihood of an explosive short circuit. An explosion in fact occurred, resulting
in the death of several persons. The defendant contended that even if no warning was
given, the purchaser should have discovered the blocks, "by making a reasonable inspec-
tion." The court held, however, that since the use of the wooden blocks was a limited
rather than a general practice in the electrical trade, a jury could find that the product
was inherently dangerous.
195. Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 326, 79
N.W.2d 688, 693 (1956). In another case involving careless use, some volunteer workers
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It thus appears that while some courts are inclined to direct a verdict for
the defendant where they consider that the product was used in a careless
manner, others, more in accordance with accepted tort principles, will leave
the foreseeability of the intervening careless handling to the jury, particularly
where a serious danger arises if there is any improper handling of the product.
Foreseeability of harm from fire. A number of recent cases have involved
products which cause grave harm when they catch fire. These decisions have
gone considerably beyond those involving specifically inflammable substances,
such as gasoline, which were recognized as inherently dangerous by courts and
legislatures even before the adoption of the modern MacPherson rule. 90 More
recently, the statutes have been extended to such matters as inflammable
fabrics and other hazardous substances. So the Federal Flammable Fabrics
Act, effective since 1953, provides penalties for the manufacture, sale or trans-
portation in interstate commerce of wearing apparel which is so highly in-
flammable as to be dangerous when worn.19 7 Various other inflammable sub-
stances are covered by the recently enacted Federal Hazardous Substances
Labeling Act.' 98 While these Acts are penal in nature, they greatly facilitate
proof in civil actions. Violation of such statutes is negligence per se, or at least
evidence of negligence, and conversely, compliance with the Act is at least
some evidence of the exercise of due care.199
Many of the cases involving inflammable products have primarily involved
breaches of a duty to warn, but in others the real difficulty, as indicated in the
discussion of the inflammable dress cases,20 0 is that the composition or design
of the product is unreasonably dangerous, with the result that a warning
might not be sufficient to make the product safe. A case which illustrates this
is Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp.,201 where one of the defendants had
manufactured, and the other had sold, a baby bathinette with supports made
of an alloy composed almost entirely of magnesium. When subjected to a
temperature of around 1100 degrees Fahrenheit the thin sheets of which these
supports were made would burn fiercely, and it was extremely difficult to ex-
tinguish any fire with water since, unless the fire were smothered, water would
in a church attempted to start a gas burner by removing a plug which was needed for some
models but was a useless appendage on this one. Removal of the plug allowed gas to escape
into the combustion chamber, causing an explosion which killed the plaintiff's decendent.
There was no clear warning concerning the plug, and under these circumstances the court
allowed the jury to determine "whether defendant reasonably should have anticipated that
inexperienced operators" would follow the course here taken. If so, there was negligence
either in failing to warn or to provide safety features which would have made more difficult
the removal of this functionless plug. Hartmon v. National Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264,
273, 60 N.W.2d 804, 811 (1953).
196. 2 FRUmER & FRIEDMAN § 35.
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1958).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (Supp. II, 1959-60).
199. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.07[1].
200. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
201. 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954) (court sitting in New York applying Michigan law),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 923 (1955).
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cause the release of inflammable hydrogen. While the bathinette was in the
bathroom of an apartment, a fire of unexplained origin started there and
reached the bathinette. As a result the fire could not be extinguished until
the alloy was almost consumed. The plaintiffs were able to get their children
out of the apartment but were injured in so doing. The wife received part of
her burns when one of the bluish flames from the bathinette shot across the
hall into her bedroom. The trial judge instructed the jury to find for the
defendant if the bathinette was not the cause of the original fire but "became
subjected to flames from a previously started fire."'20 2 The court of appeals
upheld this instruction, stating that "where an article is not inherently danger-
ous in its normal or intended use neither its manufacturer nor vendor is liable
for a result which is brought about by its subjection to unusual and extraor-
dinary conditions. '20 3
A scholarly dissenting opinion by Judge Frank takes the position that the
ordinary intended use of the bathinette was in a dwelling; that the product
was unreasonably dangerous since the "defendants knew (or should have
known) that the presence of the bathinette would easily transform an ordinary
house or apartment into a fire-trap.' '204 Since there are about a million house-
hold fires a year in the country, Judge Frank thought that the intervening fire
could not be regarded as extraordinary or unforeseeable. It was suggested
that if the prevailing opinion is generally applied, a manufacturer could supply
with impunity a wall paint which would release poisonous fumes in the event
of a fire, or window strips made of material of explosive inflammability. It is
further suggested in the dissenting opinion that a warning should have been
attached to the bathinette, but the writer concedes in this connection:
To comprehend the nature of defendants' negligence, one has but to ask
whether defendant could have sold their bathinettes, if there had been
affixed an easily-readable notice saying, "If a fire happens in your home,
this bathinette will probably increase the dangers greatly, because the
magnesium may ignite, causing unusual spurts of flame which will be
peculiarly difficult to extinguish." 205
As the above quotation suggests, an adequate warning probably would pre-
clude the sale of the product. The real difficulty seems to lie in the material
chosen for its construction. If some other material could have been used with-
out substantially increasing the expense or impairing the efficiency of the
product, it would seem that a jury could find that an unreasonable danger
was created, even though a household fire may be, as the prevailing opinion
states "unusual and extraordinary," for it is conceded by the majority that
danger from a fire to the plaintiffs and their children was greatly increased by
the presence of the magnesium.
202. 215 F.2d at 104.
203. Id. at 105.
204. Id. at 111.
205. Ibid.
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When we turn from things that are apt to be ignited simply from a dropped
match or a carelessly handled cigarette, as distinguished from a conflagration,
liability is much more apt to be conceded. This is shown by recoveries in the
inflammable dress cases, 20 6 although it should be observed that where a gar-
ment does not contain some highly inflammable chemical, such as nitro-cellu-
lose which will cause a sudden or flash fire, but is simply made of combustible
cloth the court may rule that the danger is not unreasonable. 20 7 Perhaps the
case which goes furthest in allowing recovery in this situation is Martin v.
Bengue, Inc.2 0 8 There the plaintiff, at home with a heavy cold, had an oint-
ment, Ben-Gay, rubbed on his chest, shoulders and neck twice a day for sev-
eral days, all in accordance with directions. As contemplated by the manufac-
turer, vapors emitted by the ointment were confined between the plaintiff's
pajama top and his body. When the plaintiff, attempting to light his cigarette,
struck a match, its head fell off and set fire to his pajama top. He was unable
to put the fire out, according to the testimony of his expert witness, because
the confined vapors ignited and caused a flash fire, with the result that he soon
was enveloped in flames.
The trial court dismissed the action, and the intermediate appellate court
affirmed on the ground that the chance of this accident was so remote that a
manufacturer of ordinary prudence would have disregarded it. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a jury properly could find an unreasonable dan-
ger. After noting that there are between fifty-five and sixty million smokers in
this country, the court concluded that "the danger of igniting the confined
vapors, by a match, cigarette, or otherwise, cannot fairly be said to have been
so patently remote as to justify the court's withdrawal from the jury of its
normal function of passing on the issue of foreseeability."20 9 Here again the
court emphasized the absence of a warning. If there were substantial reasons
for using components which produced the vapors, it would seem that an ade-
quate warning should protect the manufacturer in this situation. On the other
hand where a manufacturer makes easily inflammable pyroxoloid combs for
use in a beauty parlor, where it is customary to use heat which would be
sufficient to ignite the combs in drying hair, it would seem that a warning to
the beauty parlor operator of the fire risk would not be sufficient to save the
manufacturer from liability. Combs of such composition create an unreason-
able danger whenever they are furnished for use in such a place.2 10
206. See text accompanying note 112 mipra.
207. Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.V.2d 217 (1945).
208. 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
209. Id. at 372, 136 A.2d at 633.
210. Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930). There
is a case somewhat similar to Martin v. Bengue, Inc., involving an oil shampoo with a
flashpoint of 171 degrees Fahrenheit. While the plaintiff was using this product she struck
a match to light a cigarette, and thereupon a flash of flame engulfed her hair. The jury
found for the plaintiff, but the verdict was set aside on appeal, partly because no one ex-
pressly contradicted the testimony of the defendant's expert, who when asked if it would
have been possible under the situation stated for the shampoo to have ignited and caused
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Foreseeability of allergic reactions. It has been shown that a manufacturer
is not under a duty to anticipate abnormal uses of his product. In the past, the
courts have felt the same way about abnormal users, and have held that a
manufacturer is under no duty to take steps to protect those who are sensitive
or allergic to some ingredient in his product which does not threaten harm to
most people. So in one of the earlier cases the court stated, "We think the jury
should have been told in appropriate language that, if they believe the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries to appellee was his abnormal hypersensitiveness, but
for which the injury would not have occurred, a verdict should be returned
for defendant." 211 A considerably later case likewise takes the position that
there must be "reasonable foreseeability of danger and harm to the normal
person contemplated by the law. ' 212 In recent years, however, the courts have
imposed a duty toward allergic users in an increasing number of cases.213 Or-
dinarily this duty is fulfilled by a warning or by instructions for making of
tests.214 It would seem, however, that where a substantial number of people
are likely to suffer allergic reactions of a serious character from an ingredient
in a product, there might be a duty to eliminate, where feasible, the offending
ingredient.
In a number of cases the manufacturer has escaped liability on grounds of
his lack of knowledge that the product would cause an allergic reaction. 215
Recent decisions, however, emphasize that in the area of allergic reactions, as
in other fields, the manufacturer is held to the knowledge and skill of an ex-
pert.21 6 It would seem that if the foreseeable allergic reaction is either slight
or extremely rare a manufacturer would not have created any unreasonable
danger, since there would be so little likelihood that any substantial harm
would occur. It is clear, however, that a manufacturer must take into con-
sideration an increasingly small percentage of allergic users. While as late as
1951 a court emphasized as a basis for directing a verdict for the defendant
that the permanent-wave lotion there involved produced a reaction "in but one
allergic woman in 1,000 using it,"217 a leading decision a few years later found
a duty to warn where a much smaller percentage of allergic users was in-
the fire, replied, "It would not have been possible for it to happen." Apparently the court
felt that there was no evidence that the product was dangerous unless the plaintiff prac-
tically touched her hair with the match. Olds v. Wood, 196 Va. 960, 86 S.E.2d 32 (1955).
211. Hamilton v. Harris, 204 S.W. 450, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
212. Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 478, 235 P.2d 525, 527 (1951), in-
volving a suit against a distributor.
213. See Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 331
(1959).
214. 2 HARPER & JAMES §§ 28.7 to -.8.
215. Briggs v. National Indus., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949) ; Gould
v. Slater Woolen Co., 147 Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888). See also Bennett v. Pilot Prods.
Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951) (suit against distributor).
216. Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying New York
law) ; Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
217. Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 476, 235 P.2d 525, 526 (1951).
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volved.218 In that case, involving a deodorant, the manufacturer had received
373 complaints during the three year period in which the plaintiff had been
using the product, but it appeared that over the same period the defendant had
sold over 82 million jars of the deodorant. In holding that a duty to warn
might arise even though only a "miniscule" percentage of potential users were
endangered the court emphasized that "duties to warn are not, in all cases,
measured by solely quantitative standards" and found that the statistical anal-
ysis of injury, "so heavily relied upon by the trial court," was only one rele-
vant factor on the issue of foreseeability. 219
Where no prior allergic injuries at all of the type suffered by the plaintiff
have occurred, it would seem that the manufacturer should not incur any
liability on negligence principles. In a recent hair dye case, 220 however, a duty
to warn against the systemic allergic reaction there suffered by the plaintiff
was imposed on the manufacturer even though over fifty million packages of
the hair dye had been distributed, and it was conceded by the plaintiff that
"unless the present case is an instance, there has never been either a reported
or an established case of periarteritis nodosa caused by paraphenylenediamine
hair dye." 221 *In spite of the fact that no previous injury of this sort had
occurred, the court sustained a finding by the jury that the defendant "knew,
or by the exercise of due care should have known" of the risk of systemic in-
jury, and should have given a warning of this type of harm along with the
warning actually given of the more common allergic reactions. In substance
the court seems to be imposing a liability without fault on the manufacturer,
and it is doubtful if a finding of negligence would be sustained under these
circumstances in other jurisdictions.
CAUSATION AND RESULT WITHIN THE RISK
After the plaintiff has established that, under the standard of unreasonable
danger, the design of a product involves a likelihood of harm which should
have been foreseen by the manufacturer, he still must show that his injury
resulted from the dangerous design of the product.22 2 The hurdle of causation,
however, is less formidable in design cases than in cases involving defects in
'the manufacture of an individual item. In the latter cases there is always a
possibility that the defect arose after the product left the manufacturer's
,hands; if there is negligence of design it is apparent that the danger was not
created by any subsequent handling of the product or by its wearing out with
the lapse of time.22 3 Nonetheless even in design cases the matter of proving
218. Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying New York
law).
219. Id. at 56.
220. Braun v. Roux, Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
221. Id. at 761.
222. 2 HARPER & JAXMES § 28.12.
223. Thus in the case of the exploding Anglia car, note 32 supra and accompanying
text, it was not established that the small leak in the gas tank existed at the time the auto-
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cause in fact remains; it must be shown that the accident happened on account
of the unsafe design. Even where there is causation in fact, the defendant still
may escape liability on the ground that the result is not within the risk, that
the accident in question was not one of the general sort to be anticipated as
a result of the design in question. Finally, assuming that an unreasonable risk
has been created with reference to the type of accident that occurs, the risk
may have been terminated by adequate notice or by discovery of the danger.
While these problems have been touched upon in the preceding analyses, it
seems appropriate to treat them separately.
Cause in Fact
In a good many of the cases considered earlier where the accident results
from abnormal or careless use of the product,224 the decision may be based
on the absence of causation in fact so that the manufacturer escapes liability,
even though there may have been carelessness of design, because the harm
resulted from the improper use. There are a few design cases more specifically
based on the causation point. Thus in Ellis v. H.S. Finke, Inc.,225 where a
hoist lacked a safety device which may have been essential to make it safe, a
verdict was directed for the defendant because there was no evidence that the
safety device would have prevented this particular fall of the hoist. Likewise
in a case where a vessel or tower used in refining oil may have been unsafe
because it lacked a side exit, one reason for directing a verdict for the de-
fendant was lack of evidence that the plaintiff's decedent, who was asphyxiated
inside the tower by carbon monoxide gas, "would have been spared had the
vessel provided escape through side manways. ' ' 226
Decisions such as these simply illustrate how in a design case, as in other
areas of tort law, the plaintiff must establish that the harm which he suffered
resulted in fact from the defendant's negligence. Sometimes this may be estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence, as in the case of the vaporizer which lacked
a needed automatic device to cut off the current when the fluid evaporated.227
The court there found that evidence as to the melted condition of the vapor-
izer, and the ignited state of the chair on which it was placed, was sufficient
to establish that the improperly designed product started the fire. In other
cases causation in fact is established by expert testimony.22 It may be estab-
mobile left the manufacturer's hands, but the plaintiffs nevertheless proved causation by
showing negligence of design in failing to provide vents for escaped gasoline or vapor
where the tank was located in the trunk.
224. See text accompanying notes 164-95 supra.
225. 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960) (applying Tennessee law), discussed at text accom-
panying note 44 supra.
226. Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 250 F.2d 603, 606 (10th Cir. 1957) (applying
Oklahoma law).
227. Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 Ill. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950), discussed at text
accompanying note 30 supra.
228. See 1 FRUATER & FRIEDMAN § 12.0212].
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lished also by evidence of prior accidents involving an article of similar de-
sign or composition. 229
Proximate Cause or Result Within the Risk
Even where an unsafe design and cause in fact have been established, the
defendant may escape liability because the harm incurred is not of the kind
to be anticipated from the improper design. This does not mean that the exact
nature of the accident must be anticipated. As in other areas of tort law, it is
not necessary that the defendant, "should have been able to anticipate the par-
ticular chain of events that would result in injury in order to be held liable.1230
It is necessary, however, that the general type of hazard be foreseeable.21
This point was the crucial one in Hatch v. Ford Motor Co.,23 2 where the
defendant had designed one of its models with a pointed radiator ornament
which projected beyond the front of the radiator grill. While the car was
parked on a road, a child of six proceeding along the road collided with it and
the ornament pierced his eyeball, with resulting loss of the eye. A statute pro-
hibited the sale or operation of a motor vehicle equipped with a radiator orna-
ment which extended beyond the grill. Plaintiff alleged negligence per se based
on violation of this statute, and common law negligence based on unsafe de-
sign, creating a risk that the body of a person coming into contact with the
front portion of the vehicle would be pierced. The defendant's demurrer was
sustained. With reference to the intent of the statute the court stated:
It was not designed to protect those who, solely by reason of their own
act or omission, might come in contact with it as an inert object lawfully
standing unattended upon a highway .
In our opinion the persons whom the statute was designed to protect
are those against whom the vehicle might be brought in contact through
its being driven upon a highway and the hazard which the statute was
designed to alleviate was the hazard created by the pointed ornament
when the car was in movement thus rendering the ornament capable
through its own motion of piercing the anatomy of a person with whom
the car collided.23
Perhaps this is a correct interpretation of the risk intended to be guarded
against, although it seems especially likely that the legislature intended to
guard against any sort of collision with this unnecessary protruding ornament,
229. Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 303, 239 P.2d 48 (1951). Cf. Prasbker
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (apply-
ing Delaware law), discussed at text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
230. Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F2d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 1960) (applying New York law),
discussed at note 28 supra.
231. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 18.2; see also Frank, J., dissenting, in Hentschel v. Baby
Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 923 (1955)
(applying New York law), discussed at text accompanying notes 201-05 supra.
232. 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958).
233. Id. at 399, 329 P.2d at 608.
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as where someone falls against a parked car in the dark, or swerves into the
parked vehicle to avoid some other accident.
With reference to common law negligence of design, the court found that
there was no negligence in failing to make a vehicle with which a person
might collide while the vehicle was in a standing position, and indicated a
noticeable reluctance to let the triers of fact "be the arbiters of the design of
automobiles." Perhaps the court again is taking too restricted a view of the
risk involved from an ornament of this type.23 4 It is clear, however, that
whenever a court concludes that the particular accident is not one of the fore-
seeable risks from a particular unsafe design, the manufacturer will not incur
responsibility. This result may be expressed by saying that there is no proxi-
mate causation, or, more understandably, by finding that there was no neg-
ligence with reference to the accident that occurred., 5
Termination of Risk Created by a Manufacturer
There are a number of cases where the plaintiff establishes that a dangerous
design was used, with respect to the type of harm involved, but it is asserted
that by the time of the accident the risk originally created by the manufacturer
has terminated. The circumstance ordinarily urged as effecting termination of
the risk is that the purchaser of the product has been warned of the danger,
or has otherwise discovered it. Because of this knowledge recovery often is
denied not only to the informed purchaser himself, who may be guilty of con-
tributory fault, but also to third persons who are not informed of the danger,
usually on the ground that the use of the product by the informed purchaser
is a "superseding cause" which insulates the manufacturer's negligence.
The two decisions which best illustrate this matter in the design field are
Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner,236 and Comstock v. General Motors Corp.237 In
the Ford case the defendant manufactured a certain model car with a hood
catch so designed that it tended to come loose when the car was subjected
to a severe jolt, so that the hood might fly up and obscure the driver's vision.
When this danger was discovered, the manufacturer at once provided all its
dealers with an auxiliary catch, with instructions to install it on all cars of this
model without charge. Norman, the owner of one of the cars, was tendered
one of the catches but declined it, since he had traveled about 10,000 miles in
the car, and had not experienced any trouble with the hood. While the car
was being driven by a purchaser from Norman, the hood flew up, the vehicle
left the road as a result, and the plaintiff, a guest in the car, was injured.
234. In that connection, in a case involving a projecting open rear window of a parked
station wagon, the court thought a jury could reasonably find that injury to a pedestrian
who collided with the window was foreseeable. The accident there occurred at night, while
the plaintiff was crossing the street a short distance from the prescribed cross-walk.
Schaublin v. Leber, 50 N.J. Super. 506, 142 A.2d 910 (1958).
235. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 182; SEAVEY, COGITATIONS oN TORTS 34 (1954).
236. 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1946).
237. 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
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The Tennessee Supreme Court sustained a directed verdict for the defendant
on the ground that the intervening conduct of Norman destroyed the causal
connection between the defendant's negligence, which was assumed, and the
accident. The opinion emphasizes that since Norman was an automobile sales-
man there was no room for "any reasonable deduction other than that he was
consciously on notice of the defect and knowingly rejected the offered reme-
dy."238 Since this conscious consent to the risk would bar recovery by Norman
himself, the court thought that it likewise destroyed the causal connection be-
tween the defendant's negligence and the injury to the plaintiff.
While Norman's consciousness of the facts clearly is of significance, it may
be that the court over-emphasized this factor. It is conceded in the opinion
that "the intervening act of even an independent conscious agency will not
exculpate the original wrongdoer... unless ... the negligent intervening act
.. . could not have been reasonably anticipated." 9 On that vital point the
court merely states, "Certainly, Ford Company could not have anticipated
the conduct of Norman in rejecting the safety catch." At least two commen-
tators have felt that the intervening negligence of Norman was in fact fore-
seeable.2 0 In view of this division of opinion, perhaps a jury could have found
that Norman's conduct was foreseeable without being manifestly unreasonable.
The fact that voluntary assumption of risk would, as the court points out, bar
a suit by Norman does not in itself mean that this would bar a suit by the
plaintiff, since the defense of assumption of risk is personal to Norman. The
fact that the manufacturer took considerable precautions to avoid the conse-
quences of earlier negligence, which were frustrated by the improper conduct
of Norman, may tend to support the decision; but as a general proposition,
subsequent careful conduct does not relieve a defendant of the consequences
of earlier negligence, where the harm nevertheless results, so long as the de-
fendant's prior negligence is a substantial factor in bringing it about.2 41
The Wagoner decision, whether sound or not, illustrates a general tendency
to hold that where the manufacturer can show that an intervening actor has
consciously assumed the risk of using the dangerous product, the case should
be taken from the jury.2 4 2 The case does not hold, however, that mere negli-
238. 183 Tenn. at 404, 192 S.W.2d at 845.
239. Id. at 399, 192 S.W.2d at 843. See also 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447 (1934).
240. See Mille, Liability of a Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Product, 3 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 106, 113 (1951) ; Note, 13 U. CHi. L. REv. 518, 521 (1946). Cf. Noel, Products
Liability of a Manufacturer in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REv. 985, 991-93 (1953).
241. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 437 (1934) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES § 28.7, stating that the
Wagoner case disregards generally recognized principles on this point, and observing that
where the original flaw represents "an unreasonable and avoidable danger, later steps to
avoid injury, however reasonable, should not shield the maker from liability for his negli-
gence."
242. PROSSER, TORTS § 84, at 504 (2d ed. 1955). In Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145
Ky. 616, 621, 140 S.W. 1047, 1049 (1911), the court says that "the maker will not be liable,
if it is made to appear that the purchaser had knowledge of the defects ... before the third
party was injured in using it." The case of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221
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gence on the part of the third party, as distinguished from conscious assump-
tion of risk, always will be regarded as unforeseeable and as relieving the
manufacturer from liability.
In the other leading case on termination of risk, Comstock v. General
Motors Corp.,2 3 the court shows much less inclination to find that intervening
discovery of the hazard will protect the manufacturer of a negligently designed
product. The 1953 Roadmaster Buick there involved was designed with power
brakes which occasionally gave way completely. This occurred because a ring
sealer in the master brake cylinder tended to change slightly in dimensions
when exposed to cold temperatures and brake fluid pressures, allowing the
'fluid to escape. When this danger was discovered the unit was redesigned, and
the manufacturer made available to dealers a kit for the replacement of the
defectively designed unit, which was to be replaced at the manufacturer's ex-
pense. No effort was made to notify the owners of defective cars. The repre-
sentative of the manufacturer testified that any notification was the dealer's
responsibility, and the dealer testified that the manufacturer's service depart-
ment told him not to send letters, since the information would then become
public.
One of the owners, Friend, discovered that his brakes were not operative.
He called a repairman at the dealer's garage, Wentworth, who said that he
knew what was wrong and to bring the car in. Using the emergency brake,
with his wife's car ahead as a bumper, Friend carefully drove his Buick into
the garage and left it with Wentworth, who omitted to place the usual "no
brake" sign on the car. A few minutes later Wentworth, completely forgetting
that the car had no brakes, drove it toward a repair stall. When the brakes
failed to function, the leg of an employee working at the rear of another
vehicle was crushed.
In a suit against the manufacturer it was urged that assuming there was
negligence of design, or in any event an improper failure to warn the owners
of this model after the inadequate design was discovered, there could be no
recovery in this case because the owner of the car became completely informed
of the brake failure, with the result that there was no cause in fact. The court
replied that Friend evidently took good care of his automobile and that a
prompt warning to him "would in all likelihood have meant repair before any
brake failure occurred." The manufacturer then urged that Wentworth's neg-
ligence was an intervening or superseding cause. The court held, however,
Miss. 378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954), involving a chemical furnished by the defendant for use
in animal food, holds that a warning to the distributor that the chemical supplied is dan-
gerous to cattle, as distinguished from hogs and poultry, is sufficient to save the defendant
from liability. While the court cites the Wagoner decision, the facts in the Ladner case
seem somewhat more favorable to the defendant, since the intervening negligence was by
a supposedly reliable processor of animal food, who acted against urgent written warnings
from the manufacturer. See also Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 688, 59 P.2d 100
(1936), where an unsuitable plank was supplied for scaffolding, and the contractor's in-
formed use of the plank prevented the supplier from being liable.
243. 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
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citing the Restatement of Torts,244 and reversing the trial judge, that the in-
tervening negligence would not protect the manufacturer, stating:
It takes no great imagination to foresee possibility of some negligence in
the handling of a car on which a "no brake" condition is known to exist.
This is particularly true if such "no brake" conditions are created in large
numbers. The jury could have found that the negligence of General
Motors set this whole train of events in motion and played a substantial
role in the final event. The intervening negligence herein was not de-
liberate or wanton or wilful. Nor was it extraordinary in character.
Wentworth did not deliberately determine to drive a car with no brakes.
He forgot. No more human error can be conceived of. We think such
forgetfulness as is revealed by the facts herein cannot be held to go be-
yond reasonable foreseeability.2 5
The Wagoner case was distinguished on the ground that there Norman de-
liberately continued to use the car with awareness of its lack of repair, but
some doubt is placed on the validity of this distinction by the fact that Went-
worth may have intentionally omitted to obey the precautionary rule that a
"no brake" sign be placed on the car.
Perhaps the court that decided the Wagoner case, and some other courts,
would consider that the risk in the Comstock case had terminated, and that
this particular Buick had come to a "safe" place when it was parked in the
garage with instructions to fix the completely inoperative brakes. The decision
illustrates, however, that where the product manufactured is an extremely
dangerous one, judges may be reluctant to relieve the manufacturer of liability
even though there is intervening discovery of the hazard. In the Conistock
case the court remarked that "a modern automobile equipped with brakes
which fail without notice is as dangerous as a loaded gun." Precedent for the
decision can be found in a rather old case where an oil company supplied to
a grocer a highly dangerous mixture of kerosene and gasoline. The grocer had
considerable reason to know that the company had not effectively corrected
this mixture, but nevertheless sold some of the product to plaintiff's decedent,
who unfortunately used it to light the morning fire in the family stove. The
court there said that the defendant, in placing this dangerous mixture into
the hands of a busy storekeeper "distracted by the thousand petty details
which press daily upon such a man" should have realized that he might forget
the danger and make a sale. 246 Forgetfulness is particularly apt to occur where
the person supplied with a product will suffer the disadvantage of having un-
saleable goods on his hands if his memory is kept fresh.24 7 Perhaps the brake-
less Buick was as dangerous as this explosive mixture.
24 8
244. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 447 (1934).
245. 358 Mich. at 179-80, 99 N.W.2d at 635-36.
246. Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, 208 Ky. 507, 516, 271 S.W. 570, 574
(1925).
247. 2 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 388, comment 1 (1934).
248. So also in Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930),




In some cases based on negligence of design or composition it is asserted
that the plaintiff is barred by contributory negligence or voluntary assumption
of risk, defenses which of course are available in negligence actions general-
ly. If the design is reasonably safe except for the circumstance that the manu-
facturer has given improper directions for use, or has failed to give a needed
warning, these defenses are not apt to have merit, for ordinarily it can not be
shown that the plaintiff realized or should have realized the risk, or consented
to it, where it is established that the design is dangerous unless accompanied
by adequate directions or warnings. So unless the plaintiff was made aware
of the danger from some other source, the defendant can not effectively argue
that the accident was due to the contributory fault of the plaintiff in failing
to realize the danger which required the warning, or the shortcomings which
made the instructions inadequate. For this reason, it has been urged that in
this situation the question of contributory negligence should not even be sub-
mitted to the jury.2 49 It is evident, however, that the courts do not explore
the matter to this extent, and frequently do submit the issue of contributory
fault to the jury even though the only negligence alleged relates to the duty
to give proper warnings or directions.250
Where the principal negligence complained of is not a failure to warn or to
give proper directions, but the use of a design which creates an unreasonable
danger, it is clear that contributory negligence or voluntary assumption of risk
may be appropriate issues. There is a tendency in the design cases, however,
as in products cases generally, to restrict the defense of voluntary assumption
of risk to cases where the plaintiff in fact realized the risk and consented to
it.251 This may be illustrated by one of the few design cases in which a judg-
ment for the plaintiff has been set aside on grounds of voluntary assumption
of risk. There it had been found at the trial that a motorcycle was unsafely
designed because it lacked a device to lock the knob of a "damper" intended
flammable celluloid combs there involved was not terminated when the manufacturer noti-
fied the dealer of their inflammable character. The situation seems much like that in an-
other of the older cases where the defendant manufactured highly inflammable stove polish,
and was not protected by the fact that the retailer had full knowledge of the dangerous
character of the product. Clement v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 163, 111 N.W. 745 (1907).
249. See Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn,
41 VA. L. REV. 145, 163 (1955).
250. See 1 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN § 8.06, citing a number of cases which submit the
contributory fault issue to the jury in duty to warn cases.
251. See, e.g., Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 919 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948) (to assume a risk "one must know what he is assuming").
On the other hand, the court in one leading design case seems to be going beyond the con-
cept of consent, either subjective or objectively manifested, in a dictum that the plaintiff
"might be taken" to have assumed the risk if the danger had been sufficiently "obvious."
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir. 1955), dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 158 supra. See generally Keeton, Voluntary Assumption
of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. Rnv. 122, 141-43 (1961).
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to prevent the wobbling of the front wheel at high speeds. The plaintiff's own
testimony showed that he continued his journey "with full knowledge and
appreciation of the danger from the constantly unwinding damper and the
resultant steering wobble." Under these circumstances the plaintiff was barred
by voluntary assumption of risk, since he chose to continue the trip without
"the slightest compulsion of business or otherwise. ' '252
It may be that in the current suits against cigarette manufacturers on the
ground that their products are partly composed of materials which cause can-
cer, the defense of contributory fault will be a crucial point. Where sufficient
evidence is presented to establish causation and negligence, it seems likely, in
view of the great amount of publicity which has been given to this danger,
that many plaintiffs would be barred by voluntary assumption of risk or con-
tributory negligence.2 53 When, however, the suit is based on smoking which
terminated several years ago, before all the publicity, the situation may be
different. The negligence of the defendant manufacturer still may be estab-
lished on the basis of this superior and specialized knowledge as an expert,
which should have led to tests to discover more about the composition of this
product and the presence of lurking dangers.254 The smoker, on the other
hand, with no duty to know as an expert, might well be free of contributory
fault even though he has used a product found to create an unreasonable
danger if distributed without a warranty.2 5
In a number of cases earlier considered involving abnormal or careless han-
dling of the product, the court may speak in terms of contributory negligence
or voluntary assumption of risk, when the real issue is whether there was any
negligence of design. As has been shown,256 however, a manufacturer is under
no duty to anticipate abnormal uses of his product. Where the product is
being used in an unforeseeable way, there is no negligence, or as the courts
more often say, no proximate causation with reference to the accident that
occurs, and the issue of contributory fault therefore is not reached. Likewise
there may be no duty to so design a product that it can be used carelessly
with impunity. In that connection, however, it should be considered that often
the user of the product, as in Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp.,267 in-
volving cement which caused burns, does not have the expert knowledge of
252. Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 747, 752-53 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
253. See Torts-Liability of a Cigarette Manufacturer to a Smoker Who Develops
Cancer, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 417 (1958).
254. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961). This
decision remanded the case for a new trial on both the negligence and the warranty issues.
255. See Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Ex-
plored, 34 So. CAL. L. REv. 399, 403 (1961).
256. See text accompanying notes 164-95 supra.
257. 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959), discussed at text accompanying note 181 supra.
See also Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1960) (applying New York law),
discussed at note 28 supra, where the plaintiff noticed that a rubber band binding the
shanks of a lamb was not twisted in the usual figure eight pattern, but did not realize that
as a result the band would fly off and strike him when it was grasped.
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the product possessed by the manufacturer. In other cases, involving more
experienced or expert users, the specialized knowledge of the plaintiff may
lead the court to find contributory negligence in the use of the product as a
matter of law.2 58
In some cases the court may hold as a matter of law that there is no neg-
ligence of design, when in fact the main consideration is that the plaintiff has
been guilty of contributory fault. This is particularly apt to be the case where
a court finds that the defect in the product is obvious and not latent. As has
been shown, if in fact the so-called obvious defect is one commonly avoided
by other manufacturers, and its dangerous character often is not realized by
users of the product, there may in fact be negligence of design.25 9 Where,
however, a particular plaintiff is sufficiently aware or the danger as well as of
the defect, he may be barred by contributory fault.
Perhaps the case which goes furthest in allowing a jury to find for the
plaintiff in the face of strong indications of both abnormal use and contribu-
tory fault is Webb v. Olin iMlathieson Chemical Corp.260 There the injury
occurred when the central or "receiver" portion of a rifle manufactured by the
defendant failed to withstand the stress of a backfiring shell. There was some
evidence that the steel used in the receiver contained too much sulphur, and
as a result was unduly brittle. The principal defense was that the plaintiff had
made numerous alterations. He had replaced the barrel with one which would
take a larger caliber cartridge and then had resized the new barrel to enlarge
it a bit further, and had placed a new stock on the gun. Most significantly, his
tinkering included the enlargement of the extractor slot and it was urged that
this increased the danger of an explosion back into the receiver, by diminish-
ing the support to the side of the cartridge. It further appeared that the plain-
tiff had reloaded his shells, and in so doing had increased the amount of pow-
der. Under these circumstances, a sharply divided court held that the jury
could find the plaintiff free from contributory negligence. The dissenters con-
sidered that the use of the reloaded shells in this much-altered product estab-
lished contributory negligence as a matter of law. The decision seems close to
the line both with respect to contributory negligence and abnormal use.
It should be added that ordinarily in design cases the user is not required
to test products designed by experts, and even though he does make some in-
spection, his failure to discover the hazard does not necessarily establish con-
tributory negligence.26 1 Furthermore, as in other areas of negligence law, con-
tributory negligence may be a defense even though the manufacturer's neg-
258. Day v. Barber-Coleman Co., 10 Il1. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956), dis-
cussed at note 133 supra.
259. See text accompanying notes 84-100 supra.
260. 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959).
261. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956) (applying Ohio law), discussed at text accompanying
note 158 supra.
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ligence consists in violation of a statute or ordinance. 26 2 It is only in the spe-
cial situation where legislation is passed to protect a particular class of per-
sons from their own inability to protect themselves from the risk created by
violation of the statute that contributory negligence is not a defense.2 63
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the rule laid down more than fifteen years ago in the
Restatement of Torts,264 that a manufacturer's liability may extend to negli-
gence of design, finally is coming to be of vital significance in the expanding
field of products liability. The restrictive principles that the danger must be
imminent or inherent, and that the defect of design must be latent, constantly
are being narrowed in their application and replaced by the rule that the
manufacturer is liable whenever he creates an unreasonable risk of harm.
As attorneys become increasingly aware of these developments, doubtless
there will be a steadily increasing number of suits based on negligence of de-
sign or composition. While proof of negligence in this area is difficult, the
more recent decisions show that where design negligence can in fact be estab-
lished, the courts are overcoming their earlier reluctance to let design cases
go to the jury. As a result, even where a defect in the production of an in-
dividual item may have been present, a plaintiff occasionally resorts to the
theory of negligence of design to avoid the problem of showing that the defect,
as distinguished from the improper design, existed at the time the product left
the manufacturer's hands.
While manufacturers understandably are disturbed at this increase in suits,
it is important that negligently injured persons be compensated. The manu-
facturers who decide to take more adequate steps to see to it that their prod-
ucts are of safe design and composition may find that their costs become
appreciably lower than those of their less careful competitors. More signifi-
cantly, manufacturers generally, instead of directing most all of their resources
to making their products attractive and efficient, will give an increasing amount
of attention to safety factors, with resulting diminution of loss to life and limb.
Perhaps an occasional dangerous product, such as a highly inflammable dress
or a chair of striking but unstable design, will be removed from the market,
but most of the dangers, as demonstrated by the cases discussed, are ones that
can be avoided by safety devices or alterations of design.
The foregoing analysis of the developing case law indicates that even in the
more recent cases reliance has been placed on traditional negligence principles.
There has been little tendency to invoke a rule of strict liability in cases based
on allegedly dangerous composition or design. Outside of the area of food and
drink, the few decisions imposing liability without fault have in the main been
262. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947).
263. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 13.01 n.5.
264. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 388 (1934).
[Vol. 71:816
MANUFACTURER'S NEGLIGENCE
restricted to things intimately used, such as drugs, hair dye, soap, or ciga-
rettes.2 6r As a recent article points out, even most of the courts which accept
strict liability as to food "refuse to apply it to such things as automobiles,
tires, pumps, insecticides, anti-freeze compounds, electric blankets, insulating
materials, lumber, furnaces, or a portable elevator."2 6
If in the near future the courts begin to apply strict liability principles to
mechanical and other products where unsafe design is apt to occur, it then will
be unnecessary to allege any acts of negligence, but it still may be necessary
to determine, under some concepts of strict liability, whether a design is de-
fective or dangerous. So, for example, it has been proposed that a section be
added to the Restatement of Torts [Second], providing that a manufacturer
of food be liable, even though he "has exercised all possible care," if the food
when sold is "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the con-
sumer."2 617 If this principle should be extended to other products, where de-
fective design or composition is alleged, when would the design be defective
and unreasonably dangerous? To make the issue more concrete, suppose that
twenty-five years ago not even those most learned in the field suspected that
cigarettes might cause cancer. Could cigarettes produced at that time be re-
garded as of unreasonably dangerous composition, or as defective? Or sup-
pose that a newly designed jet airplane, carefully planned by the best experts
available, and given thorough tests, later develops unsuspected tensions which
cause a wing to be torn off the plane when operated at its maximum speed.
Probably this design would be regarded as defective and unreasonably danger-
ous, although it is not clear that passengers in such a plane, flying at a tre-
mendous speed, should reasonably expect that it will be free even from flaws
not yet discovered by any of the leading experts in the field. Perhaps liability
even in this situation would be a useful means of spreading the loss; but that
holding might unduly discourage the development of useful new products.
These considerations suggest that just as there is no bright line between
negligence and no-negligence in the design field, there may be considerable
uncertainty about what products are defectively designed under a strict lia-
bility rule. In the resolution of this issue, many of the considerations which
have been discussed in connection with the negligence cases, such as the fore-
265. See Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314, 318 n.6 (10th Cir. 1958), citing
Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV.
963, 989 (1957). See also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961) (applying Pennsylvania law).
266. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1110-11 (1960). Several cases decided since the date of this article, how-
ever, have applied the strict liability principle to defective automobiles. See Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960); State
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449 (Ia. 1961).
Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960) (negligence and
perhaps even concealment of defect present, but complaint alleged only breach of warranty).
267. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, SECOND § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
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seeability of abnormal or careless use, probably will continue to be of signifi-
cance. Certainly causation will continue to be a problem. With reference to
contributory fault, while contributory negligence doubtless will disappear as
a defense under a strict liability rule, still if the plaintiff actually is aware of
the danger involved in a defectively designed product, and freely has con-
sented to encounter this danger, such conduct doubtless will be a bar to his
recovery. 268
268. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1147-48 (1960). Cf. Keeton, Voluntary Assumption of Risk in Products
Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 166 (1961).
